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Preface
"It has been said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the law of
gravity. But that does not mean we should accept a law that allows only heavy-weights
to survive. On the contrary: we must make globalization an engine that lifts people out
of hardship and misery, not a force that holds them down. We must build partnerships
strong enough to make sure that the global market is embedded in broadly shared values
and practices that reﬂect global needs, so that globalization can beneﬁt all the world's
people." (Koﬁ Annan, 2000)
As noted by Koﬁ Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, we
live in an era of an ongoing process of globalization that appears to be as natural
and inevitable as the law of gravity. Undoubtedly, the technological progress is one of
the main driving forces of globalization since it shortens distances in a broad sense by
reducing transport and communication costs. This is further fostered by the elimination
of politically-imposed barriers in recent years. The pace of the globalization process has
accelerated especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 as most of the countries
of the former Eastern bloc got involved into the global economy while undergoing a
transition process from centrally planned economies toward free market economies.
Since the process of globalization is so widespread and dynamic, its pros and cons
have been some of the most hotly-debated topics in international economics in recent
years. On the one hand, already the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage two
centuries ago (Ricardo, 1817) predicted that trade liberalization leads to a more eﬃcient
reallocation of resources which in turn creates net beneﬁts for both parties involved
in the exchange of goods. On the other hand, there are concerns about increasing
inequality resulting from the fact that the beneﬁts of globalization are unevenly spread
(see Krugman and Venables, 1995; Milanovic, 2005). Therefore, also Koﬁ Annan called
for reasonable and fair-minded rules that would amend the globalization process to
beneﬁt all.
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This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate on globalization, by studying three
diﬀerent aspects of the process. Chapter 1 shows that liberalization of the air services
sector signiﬁcantly increases air passenger traﬃc, thereby improving the performance
of the sector, facilitating face-to-face communication, and supporting the development
of other sectors of an economy such as tourism. The results also suggest that the
existing regulatory framework is very uneven as the air services sectors of low-income
countries remain heavily regulated. Chapter 2 delivers evidence about tightening inter-
dependence of stock markets that imply limited possibility for international portfolio
diversiﬁcation and increased vulnerability of the ﬁnancial sector to the transmission of
shocks from one country to another. Hence, Chapter 2 points to a potentially nega-
tive eﬀect of globalization, especially with respect to the recent global economic crisis.
Chapter 3 examines the phenomenon of multinational corporations that are found to
be the most productive ﬁrms by focusing on their internal business culture and orga-
nization. In particular, Chapter 3 provides insights into the conditions under which
multinationals transplant their business model to other countries. This is potentially
important for getting a better understanding of the ability of multinationals to trans-
plant their productivity advantage abroad.
The three chapters study increasing integration of national economies by analyzing
its characteristics, causes, and consequences. Whereas Chapter 1 assesses the process
of integration from a global perspective involving a large number of countries, the two
following chapters focus on transition economies in Eastern Europe. The three chapters
are self-contained and can be read independently of each other.
As mentioned above, the process of globalization is strongly bolstered by new trans-
port, communication, and computer technologies. One of the most dynamic sectors
driven by technological change is the air transport sector, which is studied in the ﬁrst
chapter of this thesis.1 Technological progress apart, the regulatory set-up appears to
play an important role in the development of this sector (see Micco and Serebrisky,
2006). In fact, air transport has been heavily regulated by governments since the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Conference in 1944 and only recently several countries and
regions have liberalized the regulatory framework. For instance, the countries of the
European Economic Area set up very liberal conditions for air services within their
region in the mid 1990s. However, signiﬁcant restrictions remain and, as a result, the
aviation market is regulated by a plethora of diﬀerent types of regimes, as imposed by
various bilateral and plurilateral Air Services Agreements.
1Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Roberta Piermartini, World Trade Organization (WTO).
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Chapter 1 investigates the extent of discrimination  in terms of access to interna-
tional air services  generated by this system. In particular, using recently available
information on approximately 2300 Air Services Agreements covering 184 countries, we
estimate the impact of international air services liberalization on air passenger ﬂows.
We use several measures of liberalization as well as alternative estimation techniques
to address potential problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and data inaccuracy.
In addition, we argue that the traditional approach of modeling services trade liber-
alization by means of an index does not fully account for the discontinuous nature of
services liberalization and propose the use of cluster analysis instead.
We ﬁnd strong evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant impact of the degree of liberal-
ization on passenger traﬃc. For instance, the higher degree of air services liberalization
among countries of the European Economic Area is estimated to account for rates of
passenger traﬃc which are 22 percent higher compared with traﬃc between countries
that signed Open Skies-type of agreements. The latter represents relatively liberal
types of Air Services Agreements signed mainly by the United States. Our results
suggest that the present system of a complex web of diﬀerent Air Services Agreements
generates a discriminatory environment for access to air services. The discrimination
tends to concern especially low income countries whose Air Services Agreements typi-
cally include very restrictive provisions.
Chapter 2 studies globalization from a more focused perspective by concentrating
on the Central European countries2 that have been the leaders among the Eastern
European countries in the transition process from centrally planned systems toward
free market economies. Developed countries have played an important role in the
process of transition. Especially the countries in Western Europe have invested large
amounts of capital, mainly in the form of foreign direct investment, in the Central
European region since the early 1990s (Mora, Garibaldi, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer, 2002;
Lankes and Stern, 1999). The tightening economical relations have been accompanied
by signiﬁcant institutional reforms and changes in the ﬁscal and monetary policies
of the Central European countries, driven by the attempt to join the European Union
(EU) soon. The EU accession per se on May 1, 2004 led for instance to the full removal
of restrictions on movements of capital.
Empirical literature on major developed stock markets (see, for instance, Kasa,
1992) suggests that deregulation and liberalization in capital markets, the importance
2The term "Central Europe" is used to refer to the group of four Visegrád countries, namely the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
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of foreign capital inﬂows as well as the deepening institutional integration are likely to
lead to stronger stock market integration. Chapter 2 examines whether this can also
be observed in the case of the three largest Central European markets, namely those
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The ﬁnancial integration is studied from
the perspective of a long-run convergence toward stable equilibrium relations among
the stock markets, as modeled by the Johansen cointegration method.
The results in Chapter 2 show that the Central European stock markets have indeed
become more integrated with the global economy in general and with the "old" EU
in particular after the EU accession. This is evidenced by the emergence of two new
long-run equilibrium relations in the post-accession period that link the movements
of the Central European markets to the movements of the Western European, United
States, and Russian markets, whereas no such relations could be detected before the EU
enlargement. In particular, one new relation links the Central European markets to the
Western European market, reﬂecting tighter co-movements of the "new" and the "old"
EU markets. The second new relation points at the role of the United States market
for both the Central and the Western European markets. These ﬁndings suggest that
the Central European stock markets have become more vulnerable to shocks hitting
the global economy on the one hand but more resistant to domestic shocks on the other
hand.
One important channel through which national economies become more intercon-
nected is foreign direct investment. The term foreign direct investment refers to a
situation, in which a company from one country is making an investment into building
a new enterprise in another country or acquires a majority of shares in a ﬁrm operat-
ing outside the country so that the investing ﬁrm gains control over the ﬁrm abroad.
The investing company (the parent ﬁrm) and its foreign aﬃliate (the subsidiary ﬁrm)
together form a multinational corporation. The phenomenon of multinational corpo-
rations is studied in Chapter 3.3
Recent literature on international trade has established that the most productive
ﬁrms within a national economy tend to become multinationals. But our data reveal a
startling variation in productivity levels of foreign aﬃliates across countries of the same
multinational parent ﬁrms suggesting that not all multinationals transplant their home
productivity advantage to other countries. One candidate for this startling diﬀerence
3Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Dalia Marin, University of Munich.
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in productivity levels among subsidiaries is the ability of multinationals to transplant
their business culture abroad.
Chapter 3 examines the factors which determine what type of organization is im-
plemented abroad and whether or not multinationals transplant their business model
to other countries. To investigate this, we collect original and uniquely matched parent
and aﬃliate data on the internal organization of 660 German and Austrian parent ﬁrms
and 2200 of their subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. In particular, we test the hypothesis
that the ability of multinationals to transplant their business model to foreign aﬃliates
is determined by the organization of the multinational corporation on the one hand
and the market environment on the other hand.
We ﬁnd that the organization implemented in foreign aﬃliates tends to be more
decentralized regarding the decision-making structure within the corporation compared
with the organization of the parent ﬁrm. The decision to decentralize the business
model appears to be more strongly determined by the organization of the multinational
corporation than the decision to transplant the business model. The other way round,
the decision to transplant is more aﬀected by the market conditions in both the home
and the host country. In particular, our results point to the importance of product
market competition for the transplantation of the business model.
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Chapter 1
Free Sky and Clouds of Restrictions∗
1.1 Introduction
Air transport has rapidly expanded in the last few decades. Passenger traﬃc experi-
enced an average annual increase of ﬁve to nine percent between 1960 and 2004 (Hanlon,
2006). Air cargo has grown even faster in recent years. Hummels (2007) reports that
ton-miles shipped by air increased by 11.7 percent in the period 1975 to 2004. The
reason for this rapid expansion is the substantial decline of air transport costs. Air
transport costs decreased by 92 percent between 1955 and 2004. The largest drop,
equal to 8.1 percent annually, took place between period 1955 and 1972, the period
when the use of jet engines became widespread (Hummels, 2007).
Technological progress apart, changes in the regulatory set-up may have helped in
reducing air transport costs as well. The regulatory regime that governs international
air transport has been heavily regulated by governments since the International Civil
Aviation Conference in 1944. In the absence of a multilateral agreement,1 over 3500
bilateral and plurilateral Air Services Agreements have been signed worldwide. A
ﬁrst signiﬁcant step in the liberalization process was taken in 1992, when the United
States signed its ﬁrst Open Sky Agreement with the Netherlands that eased particular
regulations on the capacity of services oﬀered. Since then, the United States have signed
over 60 Open Skies Agreements and the countries of the European Economic Area have
set very liberal conditions for air services in their region. Signiﬁcant restrictions remain
in the aviation market, however, and the result is a very complex web of diﬀerent
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Roberta Piermartini, World Trade Organization (WTO).
1Air transport services are excluded from GATS, the WTO multilateral agreement on trade in
services.
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types of regimes under which air companies operate. Therefore, interesting empirical
questions are whether air services liberalization has had a signiﬁcant impact on the
performance of the aviation industry and, more speciﬁcally, how eﬀective diﬀerent
types of agreements have been in improving market competition, lowering transport
costs, and increasing traﬃc volumes.
The empirical evidence addressing these questions is scarce and tends to use ei-
ther indices to measure the degree of liberalization or a dummy to denote the exis-
tence of a particular Air Services Agreement. In addition, the evidence is typically
limited to a subset of countries. For example, focusing on thirteen OECD countries,
Gönenç and Nicoletti (2000) construct a bilateral restrictiveness index by means of fac-
tor analysis and estimate positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of air services restrictiveness on
passenger air fares. Using the same index, Doove, Gabbitas, Nguyen-Hong, and Owen
(2001) extend Gonenc and Nicoletti's analysis to a group of 35 economies and obtain
similar results. In a study speciﬁc to the Open Skies Agreements signed by the United
States, Micco and Serebrisky (2006) show that introducing Open Skies Agreements re-
duced nominal air cargo transport costs by 9 percent between 1990 and 2003, but they
notice that the results are driven by Open Skies Agreements with middle- and high-
income countries whereas they do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of Open Skies Agreements
for low-income countries.
One important limit of the existing literature is that it does not take into account
that air services liberalization does not follow a continuous process. While tariﬀ bar-
riers in trade in goods can be progressively reduced, barriers to services trade cannot.
Air Services Agreements are diﬀerent in various respects from tariﬀ barriers and, in
particular, a wide range of types of agreements exists. To take this into account, we
suggest a novel approach to estimate the impact of air services liberalization, namely
the use of cluster analysis.
Moreover, our analysis relies on a large dataset with 184 countries. This is impor-
tant because it allows us to cover a wide range of types of agreements and address
the discontinuous nature of air services liberalization. More speciﬁcally, our dataset
includes approximately 2300 Air Services Agreements in force in 2005. Information
on the agreements is obtained from the World's Air Services Agreements (WASA)
database provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2005) and
from the "QUASAR" database developed by the World Trade Organization (WTO,
2007). As shown in Table 1.1, these agreements regulate some 80 percent of worldwide
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international scheduled passenger traﬃc in 2005 (545 million passengers out of a total
688 million passengers worldwide)2 and provide a relatively good representation of the
distribution of passenger ﬂows by income group.
Table 1.1: International Air Passengers by Income Group of Countries
Total traﬃc in 2005 Traﬃc covered by our sample
Income group Low Middle High Low Middle High
Low 1% 2% 5% 1% 1% 3%
Middle 5% 31% 4% 29%
High 51% 61%
Total 100% (688 millions) 100% (545 millions)
Notes: The grouping of countries by level of income is in line with the World Bank deﬁnition (World Bank, 2008a). Percentages do not
add up to 100, because of missing information on the level of income for some countries.
Source: Authors' calculations based on IATA On-Flight Origin-Destination Statistics 2005.
We study the impact of air services liberalization on air passenger ﬂows. Un-
derstanding the determinants of air passenger ﬂows is important ﬁrst of all be-
cause passenger transport is essential for face-to-face communication and informa-
tion exchange in business relations. This has been shown to be important for trade
(Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Herander and Saavedra, 2005) and for the choice of ﬁrm
location. Bel and Fageda (2008) show that the quality of passenger transportation
networks is an important determinant of the location of headquarters of multinational
ﬁrms as it inﬂuences the cost for processing and transmitting information eﬃciently
across establishments. A similar result is obtained by Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009).
Second, air passenger transport substantially aﬀects other sectors in the economy. For
example, international tourists and migrants are major users of air transport services.
In addition, an increasing share of goods, especially high-value and low-bulky goods,
is transported by air, not only on dedicated cargo ﬂights but also on passenger ﬂights.
Finally, focusing on the link between access to the global airline industry and urban
economic growth, Bowen (2002) shows that over the period 1984 and 1996 hubs in
rapidly-growing developing countries experienced an improved access to the interna-
tional airline network, while those in the poorest developing countries experienced a
worsening of their access. Bowen highlights the role of deregulation in increasing dis-
parity of access to the global network.
In this chapter we point at the discriminatory nature of Air Services Agreements
2Scheduled traﬃc accounts for 85 percent of total passenger traﬃc, that is, including also charter
ﬂights (Gönenç and Nicoletti, 2000). Furthermore, Air Services Agreements typically refer to rules
for scheduled ﬂights.
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as one factor explaining the uneven access to the global airline industry. To show this,
we estimate the impact of Air Services Agreements on bilateral passenger ﬂows using a
gravity-type model augmented for the degree of liberalization of the regulatory regime.3
The underlying idea is that the extent of liberalization of the aviation market is likely
to inﬂuence the toughness of competition. An increase in competition in turn may
lower prices or improve the quality of the services oﬀered, thus increasing passenger
traﬃc.4
Following the traditional approach of measuring the degree of liberalization by
means of an index, we estimate a strong positive eﬀect of air services liberalization
on passenger traﬃc. In particular, we show that this eﬀect is robust to the use of an
instrumental variable technique that addresses the possible endogeneity of the policy
variable as well as to the use of alternative indices. These are a statistical index
built using factor analysis and an expert-based index recently developed by the WTO
Secretariat (WTO, 2006).
However, our cluster analysis shows that the positive eﬀect of liberalization on pas-
senger traﬃc is driven by speciﬁc types of agreements. In particular, we estimate a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of agreements including multiple designation provisions, Open Skies-
type and European Economic Area-type of agreements. This reinforces the importance
of studying the eﬀects of air services liberalization (and in general services trade liber-
alization) on the basis of cluster analysis rather than through an index. Following this
approach we are able to address the question of air services liberalization in terms of
the impact of a worldwide adoption of a certain type of agreement rather than in terms
of an increase in the value of an index. Our results suggest that the multilateralization
of certain types of agreements is likely to signiﬁcantly increase passenger traﬃc and
reduce the uneven distribution of passenger ﬂows worldwide.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the features of
Air Services Agreements that are considered to be relevant indicators of market access
liberalization. Section 1.3 presents two diﬀerent indices of the degree of liberalization
of the aviation market and describes the extent of air services liberalization worldwide.
Section 1.4 explains our methodological approach, whereas Section 1.5 presents the
results. Section 1.6 concludes.
3A similar approach focusing on intra-APEC passenger ﬂows has been adopted by Geloso Grosso
(2008).
4Using data on country-level bilateral air fares, Piermartini and Rousová (2009) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative impact of air transport liberalization on both business and economy class passenger prices.
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1.2 Main Features of Air Services Agreements
Air Services Agreements incorporate many features covering a wide range of issues,
including aviation security or incident investigation. Nevertheless, only some features
are important determinants of liberalization of the international aviation market. The
WTO (2006) study on air services identiﬁes seven features as relevant indicators of
increased market access for scheduled air passenger services:
Grant of rights deﬁnes the right to provide air services between two countries.
In particular, the WTO study focuses on ﬁfth freedom, seventh freedom and
cabotage. Fifth freedom enables the airlines of any two countries to pick up
passengers in each other's territories for destinations in other countries. Seventh
freedom is the right to carry passengers or cargo between two foreign countries
without continuing service to one's own country. Cabotage is the right of an
airline to operate within the domestic borders of another country on a route with
origin or destination in its home country;
Capacity clause identiﬁes the regime to determine the capacity of an agreed
service. The capacity regime refers to the volume of traﬃc, frequency of service
and aircraft types. Ranging from the most restrictive to the most liberal regime,
three commonly used capacity clauses are: predetermination, Bermuda I and free
determination.5 Predetermination requires that capacity is agreed prior to the
service commencement, Bermuda I gives limited right to the airlines to set their
capacities without prior governmental approval and free determination removes
the capacity determination from regulatory control;
Pricing refers to the regime for pricing air services. The most restrictive regime
is that of dual approval, whereby both parties have to approve the tariﬀ before
this can be applied. The most liberal regime is free pricing, when prices are
not subject to the approval by any party. The semi-liberal regimes are country
of origin disapproval (where tariﬀs may be disapproved only by the country of
origin), dual disapproval (where both countries have to disapprove the tariﬀs in
order to make them ineﬀective) and zone pricing (where parties agree to approve
prices falling within a speciﬁc range and meeting certain characteristics, whereas
outside the zone one or a combination of the other regimes may apply);
5Two types, "other restrictive" and "other liberal", are distinguished in addition in WTO (2006).
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Withholding deﬁnes the conditions required for the designated airline of the
foreign country to operate in the home country. Restrictive conditions require
substantial ownership and eﬀective control, meaning that the designated airline
is the "ﬂag carrier" of the foreign country. More liberal conditions are required
under community of interests and principal place of business regimes, where a
foreign airline can also be designated by the foreign country. Whereas commu-
nity of interests regime still requires a vested substantial ownership and eﬀective
control of the airline in one or more countries that are deﬁned in the agreement,
principal place of business regime removes the substantial ownership requirement;
Designation governs the right to designate one (single designation) or more than
one (multiple designation) airlines to operate a service between two countries;
Statistics provides rules on exchange of statistics between countries or their
airlines. The fact that an exchange of statistics is (can be) requested is an
indicator that the parties intend to monitor the performance of each other's
airline. Therefore, it is considered a restrictive feature of an agreement;
Cooperative arrangements deﬁne the right for the designated airlines to enter
into cooperative marketing agreements (such as code sharing and alliances). This
is considered to be a liberal feature because it provides a means to rationalize
networks.
As shown in Table 1.2, the most restrictive regimes are the most frequent with
respect to pricing, capacity and ownership. Cooperative arrangements are in general
not allowed and exchange of statistics tends to be required. In contrast, multiple
designation dominates single designation. Among the freedoms of air, the ﬁfth freedom
is the most frequent, whereas the seventh freedom and cabotage are rare.
1.3 Degree of Air Services Liberalization
The overall degree of liberalization introduced by a certain agreement depends on its
speciﬁc design. Indices summarize the various features of an agreement in a single
ﬁgure, by assigning a weight to each provision included in the agreement. Such weight
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Table 1.2: Number of Air Services Agreements by Provision
Provision Frequency Provision Frequency
Grant of rights Withholding
Fifth freedom 1650 Substantial ownership and eﬀective control 1735
Seventh freedom 417 Community of interest 396
Cabotage 353 Principal place of business 138
Missing values 0 Missing values 59
Pricing Capacity
Dual approval 1625 Predetermination 1324
Country of origin disapproval 37 Other restrictive 125
Dual disapproval 153 Bermuda I 327
Zone pricing 8 Other liberal 10
Free pricing 381 Free determination 464
Missing values 94 Missing values 49
Designation Statistics
Single 879 Exchange of statistics required 1492
Multiple 1411 Exchange of statistics not required 807
Missing values 9 Missing values 0
Cooperative arrangements
Not allowed 2173
Allowed 126
Missing values 0
Notes: The total number of agreements available is 2299. The number of agreements with ﬁfth freedom, seventh freedom and cabotage
do not total 2299 observations, because these provisions are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, some agreements present combinations of
ownership regimes.
Source: Authors' calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
denotes the provision's marginal contribution to the liberalization of the aviation mar-
ket. There are two possible ways to assign reasonable weights. One is to rely on expert
knowledge and the other is to use a purely statistical technique such as factor analysis.
To get a better understanding of the overall degree of liberalization of the international
aviation market we use both types of indices.
The Air Liberalization Index (ALI) constructed by the WTO Secretariat (WTO,
2006) is an expert-based index. The weights assigned to the diﬀerent provisions of
an agreement were deﬁned in consultation with a group of experts on aviation indus-
try with a view to capturing the relative importance of each provision in liberalizing
the sector. As a result, each provision got a weight between zero and eight and the
ALI ranges between zero and 50, where zero is associated with the most restrictive
agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement.6
6There are four weighting schemes proposed by WTO (2006). The resulting indices are, however,
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Following the approach of previous empirical literature (Gönenç and Nicoletti,
2000), we construct a second index of air services liberalization by means of factor
analysis (see Appendix 1.A.1 for more details). This statistical index (Factor Analysis
Index or FAI) ranges between zero and one and increases with the degree of liberaliza-
tion of the aviation market.7
The comparison between the relative importance that each indicator of liberal-
ization takes in these two indices shows that grant of rights and withholding have a
relatively higher weight in the ALI than in the FAI, whereas the opposite is true for
statistics and cooperative arrangements (see Table 1.3). Nevertheless, overall the ALI
and the FAI are highly correlated with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.97 and a Spearman
correlation coeﬃcient based on the countries-pair ranking equal to 0.92. This is the re-
sult of a typically high correlation among individual indicators of liberalization within
an agreement. For instance, 96 percent of agreements with the restrictive dual approval
pricing regime also require a withholding regime of substantial ownership and eﬀective
control. Average values of ALI and FAI by country are reported in Appendix 1.A.2.
Table 1.3: The Informed Index (ALI) and the Statistical Index (FAI)
Comparison of Weighting Schemes
Indicators of liberalization ALI weights FAI weights
Grant of rights 0.36 0.17
Capacity 0.16 0.17
Pricing 0.16 0.18
Withholding 0.16 0.1
Designation 0.08 0.08
Statistics 0.02 0.11
Cooperative arrangements 0.06 0.19
Sum of weights 1 1
Notes: ALI and FAI refer to the Air Liberalization Index and Factor Analysis Index, respectively. The weights reported for the ALI are
not the original ones, but they are adjusted to sum up to one for a better comparison with the weights of the FAI. For the deﬁnition of
the indicators of liberalization see Table 1.10 in Appendix 1.A.1.
Source: Authors' calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
As shown in Figure 1.1 both indices present a distribution highly skewed toward
the left. Overall, existing agreements provide a limited degree of liberalization of the
aviation market. Approximately 70 percent of agreements are very restrictive with an
ALI (FAI) below 15 (0.4). Very few agreements introduce an intermediate degree of
liberalization. A high degree of liberalization with an ALI over 40 is reached only in
highly correlated (the correlation is over 90 percent). Therefore, in this chapter we report the results
for only one of them, the standard ALI.
7The constructed FAI is broadly consistent with the index of bilateral restrictiveness (BRI) cal-
culated by Gönenç and Nicoletti (2000) with a high negative correlation coeﬃcient of -0.84.
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15 percent of country-pairs. This is mainly because of the liberalization of air services
among countries in the European Economic Area for which the ALI takes a value of 43.
Figure 1.1: Histograms of the Degree of International Air Services
Liberalization
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Source: Authors' calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
An interesting aspect of the complicated web of regulations set up by the Air
Services Agreements is to what extent they liberalize aviation markets in developing
relative to developed countries. Figure 1.2 reveals that the higher the income of the
countries, the more liberal agreements signed between the countries tend to be.
Figure 1.2: International Air Services Liberalization by Income Level
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Note: The grouping of countries by level of income is in line with the World Bank deﬁnition (World Bank, 2008a). "Low",
"mid", and "high" refer to low-income, middle-income, and high-income countries, respectively.
Source: Authors' calculations based on ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
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1.4 Empirical Model
The gravity model is the workhorse model for analyzing international trade ﬂows, but
it is also used to describe migration ﬂows and trip distributions in general. To assess
the impact of air services liberalization on the international aviation market, we adjust
the gravity model for modeling bilateral air passenger traﬃc and estimate it in the
following log-linear form:
log(traﬃcij) = β1air liberalization ij + β2ASA age ij + β3 log(trade ij)+
+ β4 log(distance ij) + β5border ij + β6colony ij + β7language ij+
+ β8 log(GDP i) ∗ log(GDP j) + γi + γj + ²ij, (1.1)
where log denotes the natural logarithm and ²ij is an error term.
The dependent variable (the log of) traﬃcij is the total number of air passengers
traveling between country i and country j in 2005. Our explanatory variable of interest,
air liberalization ij, denotes the degree of air services liberalization between the two
countries in the corresponding year as measured by the Air Liberalization Index (ALI)
or the Factor Analysis Index (FAI). We expect that the degree of liberalization of
air passenger services has a positive impact on the number of air passengers. To the
extent that Air Services Agreements by improving market access to foreign markets
introduce more competition in the sector and allow for a better rationalization of the
air services, they will yield lower air fares and/or better quality of the air services
(see Piermartini and Rousová, 2009). Consumers can be expected to respond to these
changes by ﬂying more.
We further augment the standard gravity model with a variable capturing the num-
ber of years (ASA age ij) since the ﬁrst Air Services Agreement (ASA) entered into
force. This variable attempts to account for the eﬀective implementation of an agree-
ment and the more likely realization of its pro-competitive eﬀects. We expect this
variable to aﬀect passenger ﬂows positively. We also include total bilateral trade ﬂows
(trade ij), deﬁned as the sum of bilateral exports and imports. We expect bilateral
passenger traﬃc to be higher between countries that trade more, because trade rela-
tions increase the need for face-to-face communication. To avoid any contemporaneous
feedback we use one-year lagged trade data.
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The following four variables in Equation (1.1)  distance ij, border ij, colony ij and
language ij  are the standard gravity regressors. They denote, respectively, the distance
in kilometers between the most populated cities in countries i and j, whether the two
countries share a common border, a colonial link or a common oﬃcial language. We
expect these standard gravity regressors to have the usual eﬀect on passenger traﬃc,
except for the border dummy. In the gravity models applied to trade ﬂows, this eﬀect
is in general estimated to be positive and signiﬁcant. Conversely, in the case of air
transport services, we expect a negative impact of adjacency of countries on the number
of passengers. The reason is that the existence of a common border makes it easier for
people to use alternative means of transport to air transport (e.g. rail and road) to
travel between two countries.
We adopt the approach suggested in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and include
country ﬁxed eﬀects (denoted as γi and γj) to account for any country-speciﬁc factor
that may determine diﬀerences in the number of passengers across countries such as
GDP, GDP per capita, population or remoteness of the country.8 We also include the
interaction term log(GDP i) ∗ log(GDP j) to control for the possibility of a non-linear
impact of income on passenger ﬂows. We expect a positive coeﬃcient for this variable,
as the propensity to ﬂy is likely to disproportionately increase with the level of income.9
Data sources for all variables used are provided in Appendix 1.A.3.
1.5 Results
We start estimating Equation (1.1) using the standard OLS estimation method with
robust standard errors. The results reported in Table 1.4, column (1), show a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of air services liberalization on passenger ﬂows. In particular,
an increase in the degree of liberalization from the 25th percentile (when ALI = 6)
to the 75th percentile (when ALI = 34) is estimated to increase traﬃc volumes by
21 percent.10 We also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the number of
8Since our dependent variable is symmetric we do not distinguish whether the country i (resp.
country j) is the country of origin or the destination country. More speciﬁcally, we can write γi+γj =∑
k γkDijk, where Dijk is deﬁned as a 0-1 dummy equal to one when a country k is either country i
or country j.
9Analogous non-linear impacts of other country speciﬁc factors such as a non-linear impact of
GDP per capita are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant and, therefore, they are not included in
Equation (1.1).
10The formula to compute this eﬀect is [exp(0.0067 ∗ (34− 6))− 1)] ∗ 100%.
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years since the ﬁrst Air Services Agreement was signed between two countries. This
is in line with the expectation that older agreements are more likely to be eﬀectively
implemented. An additional year of an existing Air Services Agreement between two
countries is related to an increase in passenger traﬃc by 0.5 percent. All coeﬃcients
of the other explanatory variables have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant. Overall,
the gravity model explains an important proportion of the variance of the data, with
an adjusted R2 of 0.79.
Table 1.4: Determinants of International Passenger Flows
The role of Air Liberalization Index (ALI)
Dependent variable: log(traﬃc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Distance
< 8000 km
Distance
< 5000 km
Distance
< 5000 km &
no low-low
income
Distance
< 5000 km &
no high-high
income
ALI 0.0067** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.013*
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
ASA age 0.0053*** 0.0041** 0.0039* 0.0035 -0.00028
(0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.13) (0.91)
Log (trade) 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (distance) -0.59*** -0.48*** -0.40*** -0.32*** -0.59***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Border -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.51*** -0.15
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31)
Colony 0.35*** 0.25* 0.21 0.22 0.20
(0.00) (0.05) (0.22) (0.19) (0.29)
Language 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.83***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(GDPi)*log(GDPj) 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.037***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1223 1039 845 792 600
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.76
Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.
Estimates are based on OLS with robust standard errors. ALI refers to the Air Liberalization Index.
A typical problem commonly neglected in the literature on air services liberalization
is the bias that may be introduced by a possible mismatch between the air transport
regulation in force between two countries and the regulation applying to each of the pas-
sengers ﬂying between the two countries. Data on the number of passengers traveling
between two countries (A and B) typically refer to the true origin and true destina-
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tion of each passenger. This type of data does not allow us to distinguish between
passengers ﬂying directly and passengers ﬂying via a third country. For example, if
a passenger travels from country A to country B via (unknown) country C, the rules
governing his/her trip are not those established by the Air Services Agreement between
countries A and B, but those established by the agreements between countries A and
C and between countries B and C.
In order to minimize this potential bias, we estimate Equation (1.1) only for the
sample of country-pairs that are connected by a direct air service. When a direct service
between two countries exists, we can reasonably assume that most of the bilateral
passenger traﬃc is regulated on the basis of the bilateral agreement signed by the two
countries. In fact, case studies suggest that the number of passengers traveling via
a third country when a direct service exists is a small percentage of total passenger
ﬂow.11 In contrast, when there is no direct ﬂight, the degree of air services liberalization
deﬁned in the agreement between two countries does not represent the conditions under
which airlines operating the indirect connection work.12
To address the mismatch in the passenger data and the regulatory data, we run
regressions on sub-samples of country pairs with distances below 8000 and 5000 km
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.4, respectively. The underlying idea is that passen-
gers are more likely to ﬂy directly on shorter distances, because stopovers prolong the
total duration of travel relatively more on short-distance than on long-distance ﬂights
and because short-distance ﬂights are more frequent. Therefore, we expect a better
correspondence between passengers and regulation on short-distance ﬂights than on
long-distance ﬂights. We indeed ﬁnd a stronger impact of air services liberalization
on traﬃc ﬂows in these sub-samples than in the full sample (the ALI coeﬃcient in-
creases from 0.0067 to 0.018). This suggests that the possible problem created by
data mismatch does not undermine our results. On the contrary, if any, the bias acts
toward underestimating the impact of air services liberalization on the number of air
passengers.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.4 we remove from the sample of short-distance
routes country-pairs of two low- and two high-income countries, respectively, to test
11For example, estimates for a ﬂight from London Gatwick to Dallas based on 1996 information
show that non-EU passengers constitute less than 20 percent of total passengers (Hanlon, 2006). Since
London is an important hub for long-haul ﬂights we should expect this percentage to be even lower
for other countries and on other routes.
12This is conﬁrmed by the data. When we run regressions only for the sample of country-pairs
without a direct service link, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient for the ALI is insigniﬁcant.
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the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent income groups. The estimated coeﬃcient for
ALI remains positive and signiﬁcant, though it is somewhat smaller for the sample of
agreements signed by low- and middle-income countries (column (4)) than for those
signed by middle- and high-income countries (column (5)).
1.5.1 Alternative Estimation Methods
A standard problem of studies that look at the impact of liberalization policies is the
potential endogeneity of the policy variables. One way in which the endogeneity prob-
lem can arise in the model is if countries respond to the actual traﬃc volumes by
signing more liberal agreements. For instance, a country could tend to sign liberal
agreements with partners with which it has low traﬃc volumes in order to promote
bilateral traﬃc. In this case the coeﬃcients resulting from OLS estimations would be
biased downwards. On the other hand, OLS will overestimate the impact of liberal-
ization on passenger traﬃc, if a country tends to sign liberal agreements with partners
with whom it already shares high traﬃc volumes.
To address the endogeneity problem, we run instrumental variable (IV) regressions
and report the results in Table 1.5, columns (2) to (4). We use two instruments. The
ﬁrst instrument is the interaction between the average levels of the ALI (denoted as
AvALI ) of the two countries in a pair. This instrument is motivated by the expectation
that the bilateral degree of air services liberalization is positively inﬂuenced by the
overall level of air services liberalization of each country in the pair and that this
eﬀect is likely to be magniﬁed if both countries have already high overall degree of
liberalization. The results of the ﬁrst stage regression in column (2) conﬁrm this
expectation as the coeﬃcient of the interaction term AvALI i ∗AvALI j is estimated to
be positive and signiﬁcant.13 Furthermore, this instrument is likely to be exogenous to
bilateral traﬃc ﬂows, because the average level of air services liberalization of a country
is determined by negotiations with a variety of partners (the average number of partners
for a country in our sample is 25). In particular, the reversed causality problem tends to
be minimized: If bilateral traﬃc ﬂows inﬂuenced governmental decisions to sign a new
Air Services Agreement between the relevant country pair, the overall liberalization
level would change only marginally due to a change in one bilateral agreement.
13Note that the linear eﬀect of AvALI i + AvALI j on ALI ij is already captured by the country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
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As an alternative instrument, we use the share of trade in time-sensitive goods
in total trade, denoted as time-sensitive trade share. We deﬁne time-sensitive those
sectors, for which the share of imports via air exceeds 40 percent.14 The rationale for
using this instrument relies on the political economy argument that producers of time-
sensitive goods will lobby the government to liberalize air cargo transport in order to
beneﬁt from lower prices. Since negotiations are costly, liberalization of passenger and
cargo air services are likely to go hand in hand. As a result, a high share of trade in
time-sensitive goods is likely to act toward liberalization of Air Services Agreements
regulating passenger traﬃc. The results reported in the ﬁrst stage regressions in column
(3) conﬁrm this intuition. In addition, we expect this instrument to be exogenous
because there is no particular reason why people trading in time-sensitive goods would
tend to ﬂy more (or less) than people active in other sectors.
The results obtained using the IV estimations conﬁrm a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the degree of air services liberalization on the number of passengers. The coef-
ﬁcient of the ALI estimated with the IV method is always higher than that estimated
with OLS. This supports the hypothesis that endogeneity arises because countries
tend to sign more liberal agreements with the intention to promote initially low traﬃc
ﬂows. When using both instruments jointly in column (4), the Sargan-Hansen test of
over-identifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e.,
uncorrelated with the error term.
To check the robustness of our results to diﬀerent estimation techniques, we
also use the Poisson and the Negative Binomial (NB) estimation methods. These
techniques take into account that bilateral passenger traﬃc is a count variable, i.e.
non-negative and discrete, and address the heteroscedasticity pattern in the data
(Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The results of these regressions are reported in Table 1.5,
columns (5) and (6). The coeﬃcient for the ALI remains positive and signiﬁcant. The
more ﬂexible NB regression turns out to be more suitable than the Poisson regression
according to the test for over-dispersion and the coeﬃcients obtained by the NB appear
to be very similar to those of OLS in column (1). Although the NB is a methodology
explicitly designed for count data, OLS estimation is in our case a satisfactory method
as well. The reason is that the values of the count variable are large and dispersed and
thus the characteristics of the variable are similar to those of a continuous variable.
The average number of passengers in our sample is over 410,000.
14Data on imports via air are obtained from the Global Trade Atlas and refer to the US (the list
of the time-sensitive sectors is reported in Table 1.12 in Appendix 1.A.3).
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In conclusion, the most conservative estimate regarding the variable of interest is
obtained by the standard OLS estimation method. For this reason the results presented
hereafter are those obtained using this method.
1.5.2 Alternative Measures of Liberalization
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to the use of alternative measures of air
services liberalization. Table 1.6 shows the estimated eﬀects of increasing the degree
of liberalization from the 25th to the 75th percentile using the two alternative indices:
the ALI and the FAI. The results are broadly consistent, with a slightly higher estimate
for the FAI (22 percent increase in the number of passengers) than for the ALI (21
percent increase).
Table 1.6: The Informed Index (ALI) and the Statistical Index (FAI)
Comparison of Estimated Eﬀects
Index Estimated
coeﬃcient
Range of the
index
(min-max)
25th
percentile
75th
percentile
Estimated
eﬀect
ALI 0.0067*** 0-50 6 34 21%
(0.01)
FAI 0.30*** 0-1 0.08 0.73 22%
(0.01)
Notes: *** denote 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Estimated coeﬃcients are obtained by OLS with robust standard errors using the same
speciﬁcation as in Table 1.4, column (1). P-values are reported in parentheses. The column titled "Estimated eﬀect" reports the estimated
impact on passenger volumes of an increase in the index from the 25th to the 75th percentile. ALI and FAI refer to the Air Liberalization
Index and the Factor Analysis Index, respectively.
1.5.3 Cluster Analysis
Despite the fact that economic literature tends to use indices to measure the degree of
liberalization of international air services markets,15 it is impossible to formulate a pol-
icy in terms of a certain increase in the index of liberalization. The use of indices does
not allow us to single out which speciﬁc provision aﬀects passenger ﬂows. On the other
hand, it is very diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of each provision on passenger ﬂows,
because restrictive (liberal) provisions tend to go hand in hand with other restrictive
15The same approach tends to be used for measuring the degree of liberalization of other types of
services (see Dihel and Shepherd, 2007).
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(liberal) provisions within one agreement, thus creating a problem of multicollinerity
in estimations.
To address the issue of multicollinearity and to identify the relative importance
of diﬀerent types of agreements for passenger ﬂows, we use cluster analysis. Clus-
ter analysis is a suitable tool to distinguish various types of agreements, because it
classiﬁes objects (agreements) into diﬀerent groups (clusters) according to their "simi-
larity". In the analysis that follows, we use agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis
(Härdle and Simar, 2007) that takes each observation as a separate cluster at the be-
ginning and merges them successively into larger and larger clusters.
We conduct cluster analysis in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we identify provisions
that have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on passenger ﬂows by running three diﬀerent types of grav-
ity regressions. First, we run a set of 19 regressions, one for each provision (modeled
by a dummy variable). Then, we run a set of seven regressions, each one includ-
ing the group of provisions speciﬁc to a certain indicator of liberalization (grants of
right, withholding, etc.). Finally, we run one regression with all provisions. Using a
non-conservative signiﬁcance level of 15 percent to detect all potentially inﬂuential pro-
visions, we identify nine provisions, signiﬁcant in at least one regression.16 These are
seventh freedom, cabotage, free determination of capacity, free pricing, community of
interest, multiple designation and no requirement for statistical exchange  all showing
a positive eﬀect on passenger ﬂows  and dual approval and substantial ownership and
eﬀective control  showing a negative sign.17 In the second step, we use these nine
provisions as distinguishing features for the cluster analysis.
The ﬁrst level of aggregation reveals 24 diﬀerent types of existing agreements. In
order to obtain more balanced clusters in terms of the number of agreements, we opted
for higher levels of aggregation. Table 1.7 displays seven clusters obtained at the sev-
enteenth level of aggregation. This level turned out to be reasonable in terms of the
number of observations in each cluster and in terms of explanatory power in the grav-
ity regressions. Clusters are ordered from the most restrictive to the most liberal type
(from C1 to C7) and for each cluster the percentage of agreements characterized by
a certain provision is reported. For instance, cluster C1 includes the most restrictive
16The results of these regressions are available on request.
17Recall that passenger traﬃc data do not contain information on stop-overs. For this reason we
use only the sample of country pairs with a direct service link. It is therefore not surprising that ﬁfth
freedom that relates exclusively to stop-over ﬂights is not found to be signiﬁcant in this sample. The
fact that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁfth freedom for the sample of country pairs without a direct
connection conﬁrms this intuition.
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types of agreements, none of which contains a liberal feature. Three types of agree-
ments denoted by clusters C1, C3, and C7, respectively, are very frequent and account
together for more than 90 percent of Air Services Agreements.
Table 1.7: Diﬀerent Types of Agreements Identiﬁed by Cluster Analysis
Clusters C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Observations 291 45 319 64 62 63 305
Liberal provisions
Seventh freedom 0 0 0 0 0 32 100
Cabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 92
Free determination of capacity 0 0 0 0 0 90 100
Free pricing 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
Community of interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 99
Multiple designation 0 0 100 100 89 93 100
Exchange of statistics not required 0 100 0 100 2 86 100
Restrictive provisions
Dual approval of tariﬀs 100 100 100 100 14 8 0
Substantial ownership and eﬀective
control
100 100 100 100 77 97 0
Notes: Percentage of agreements containing corresponding provision within each cluster is reported. Incomplete agreements are excluded.
Clusters are obtained by Ward's clustering algorithm using Jaccard binary measure of similarity.
Using the standard gravity model to explain bilateral passenger ﬂows, we estimate
the impact of diﬀerent types of agreements by adding to the standard explanatory vari-
ables six dummies, one for each cluster C2 to C7. We report the results in Table 1.8,
column (1). The agreements falling in clusters C3, C4, C6, and C7 have an increas-
ingly positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on passenger ﬂows relative to the most restrictive
agreements of cluster C1 that form a reference group.
The most liberal cluster C7 is found to have the largest impact on the number
of passengers. Passenger traﬃc is estimated to be 58 percent higher among countries
applying these types of regulations than among countries falling in the most restric-
tive cluster C1.18 Cluster C7 includes all country pairs covered by the Air Transport
Agreement between EU and Switzerland and the European Economic Area (EEA) in-
volving the EU countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein as well as two bilateral
agreements of New Zealand (with Brunei Darussalam and Singapore). In particular,
this result shows the importance of free pricing, seventh freedom, cabotage rights and
the removal of the requirement for substantial ownership and eﬀective control for an
eﬀective liberalization of international air services.
18We calculate this eﬀect as (exp(0.46)− 1) ∗ 100%.
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Table 1.8: Determinants of International Passenger Flows
The Role of Diﬀerent Types of Air Services Agreements
Dependent variable: log(traﬃc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Distance
< 8000 km
Distance
< 5000 km
Distance
< 5000 km &
no low-low
income
Distance
< 5000 km &
no high-high
income
C2 -0.072 -0.040 -0.019 0.040 0.024
(0.62) (0.82) (0.92) (0.85) (0.91)
C3 0.14* 0.22** 0.22* 0.26* 0.20#
(0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15)
C4 0.21* 0.29* 0.25# 0.28* 0.22
(0.10) (0.05) (0.16) (0.10) (0.27)
C5 0.087 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.016
(0.56) (0.23) (0.40) (0.53) (0.94)
C6 0.31* 0.50** 0.50# 0.61* 0.55#
(0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16)
C7 0.46*** 0.83*** 1.05*** 1.17*** 0.70**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
ASA age 0.0060*** 0.0047** 0.0043* 0.0033 0.00027
(0.01) (0.04) (0.10) (0.19) (0.94)
Log(trade) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(distance) -0.56*** -0.43*** -0.34*** -0.27*** -0.54***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Border -0.41*** -0.35** -0.37*** -0.46*** -0.097
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.57)
Colony 0.42*** 0.30** 0.22 0.27 0.22
(0.00) (0.04) (0.25) (0.19) (0.31)
Language 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.35** 0.30** 0.71***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Log(GDPi)*log(GDPj) 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.030*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1082 919 755 712 514
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.75
Notes: ***, **, *, # denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5, 10, and 20 percent signiﬁcance levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.
Estimates are based on OLS with robust standard errors. The omitted group is cluster C1.
Cluster C6 is the second most liberal cluster identiﬁed. It includes 45 Open Skies
Agreements signed by the United States and gathers agreements with multiple desig-
nation, free determination of capacity and a semi-liberal price regimes (i.e. in between
dual approval and free pricing). Passenger traﬃc related to this cluster is estimated to
be approximately 36 percent higher than in cluster C1.
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The positive coeﬃcient for cluster C4 and C3 shows the importance of multiple
designation, that accounts for some 15 to 21 percent increase in passenger traﬃc com-
pared to cluster C1. The countries that most frequently appear in these groups are:
for cluster C4 the United States and France (in eight agreements), Tunisia and Brazil
(in six agreements) and Paraguay (in ﬁve agreements); for cluster C3 United Kingdom
(37 agreements), Hong-Kong China (22 agreements), India (21 agreements), Singapore
(16 agreements) or Malaysia (15 agreements).
To check the robustness of the results, we estimate the eﬀects of diﬀerent types
of agreements using various subsamples in columns (2) to (5) of Table 1.8. In line
with the results in Table 1.4, we ﬁnd a stronger impact of air services liberalization on
passenger ﬂows, when using subsamples of short-distance ﬂights (columns (2) and (3)).
Similarly, the impact is estimated to be higher when using the sample of agreements
signed by high- and middle-income countries (column (4)) compared to the sample of
agreements signed by middle- and low-income countries (column (5)). The diﬀerence is,
however, rather small for the type of agreements with multiple designation and Open
Skies-type of agreements, which suggests a similar response of passenger traﬃc ﬂows
to the implementation of those two types of agreements across countries with diﬀerent
level of income.
Overall, we consistently ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of agreements that intro-
duce multiple designation (cluster C3 and C4), Open Skies-type of agreements (cluster
C6), and the EEA-type of agreements (cluster C7). The result that more liberal agree-
ments increase passenger ﬂows the most also appears to be robust.
Finally, using the most conservative estimates from Table 1.8 (those for the full
sample in column (1)), we conduct in Table 1.9 a small simulation exercise to get a
better understanding of the likely impact of a worldwide application of three diﬀerent
types of agreements: those including multiple designation provisions (cluster C3), Open
Skies-type (cluster C6), and EEA-type (cluster C7). The ﬁgures show a strong positive
eﬀect of the adoption of these types of agreements worldwide. For example, the world
wide adoption of Open Skies- and EEA-type of agreements is estimated to increase
worldwide passenger traﬃc by 10 and 20 percent, respectively.
In addition, in all liberalization scenarios depicted in Table 1.9 the highest per-
centage increases in traﬃc tend to occur on routes to and from low-income countries,
followed by middle-income countries. This suggests that multilateralization of these
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types of agreements would signiﬁcantly reduce the uneven distribution of passenger
traﬃc (see Table 1.1 in Section 1.1). However, the exact ﬁgures obtained for the dif-
ferent income groups of countries should be interpreted with caution, as we do not
account in the simulation for the tendency in our data that the size of the eﬀect of
liberalization on traﬃc ﬂows can somewhat diﬀer with the level of income as suggested
by results in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 1.8 and 1.4.
Table 1.9: Worldwide Adoption of Diﬀerent Types of Agreements
Estimated Increase in Passenger Traﬃc by Income Level
Type of agreement Income group Low Middle High World
wide
Multiple designation (C3) 2%
Low 9% 8% 5%
Middle 6% 3%
High 1%
Open Skies-type (C6) 10%
Low 30% 27% 24%
Middle 24% 17%
High 4%
EEA-type (C7) 20%
Low 50% 47% 45%
Middle 43% 34%
High 10%
Notes: Percentage increases in passenger traﬃc are simulated assuming that a more liberal regime is adopted by country pairs whose air
traﬃc is regulated by a more restrictive type of agreement. The coeﬃcients of 0.14, 0.39, and 0.57 estimated in column (1) of Table 1.8
are used, respectively, for the type of agreements with multiple designation, for the Open Skies-type, and the EEA-type of agreements.
1.6 Conclusions
The aviation industry has been highly regulated both domestically and internationally,
with governments setting conditions on ownership, capacity and fares. The conditions
under which air companies operate between two countries are typically set by bilateral
Air Services Agreements and, in a few cases, plurilateral agreements apply. Although
in the last 30 years countries have undertaken a process of liberalization of the industry,
the outcome of this process has been a very unevenly liberalized global aviation mar-
ket, where high-income countries tend to sign less liberal agreements with low-income
countries than with middle- and high-income countries.
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To assess the economic impact of the present system of Air Services Agreements,
this chapter focuses on international air passenger transport, an important factor in
facilitating trade and in the development of other sectors of an economy such as tourism.
Relying on detailed information on the regulatory set-up of the aviation market for a
sample of some 2300 Air Services Agreements, we estimate the impact of the degree of
air services liberalization on the volume of international passenger ﬂows.
Following the traditional approach of measuring the degree of liberalization by
means of an index, we ﬁnd strong evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant impact of the
degree of liberalization of the international aviation market on passenger traﬃc. In
particular, we estimate that increasing the degree of liberalization from the 25th to the
75th percentile increases passenger traﬃc by approximately 21 percent. This eﬀect is
shown to be robust to potential problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and data
inaccuracy.
However, unlike the removal of tariﬀ barriers in goods, the liberalization of air
transport services cannot take place in the form of a continuous process of liberalization.
For this reason we conduct a cluster analysis to disentangle the eﬀects of diﬀerent
types of possible agreements. Using this approach, we show that the positive eﬀect
of liberalization on passenger traﬃc is driven by particular types of agreements: those
including multiple designation, Open Skies-type, and European Economic Area-type
(EEA-type) of agreements. For instance, we estimate that traﬃc ﬂows regulated by
the very liberal EEA-type of agreements tend to be by some 22 percent higher that
traﬃc ﬂows regulated by the Open Skies-type of agreements. In addition, our results
suggest that multilateralization of multiple designation provisions and Open Skies-type
of agreements is likely to increase passenger traﬃc worldwide by two and ten percent,
respectively.
More research is needed to quantify the impact of Air Services Agreements on
cargo traﬃc. The results of this chapter, however, suggest a very important policy
implication. The present system of a plethora of Air Services Agreements characterized
by a variety of degrees of liberalization generates a discriminatory environment for
access to air services. This discrimination appears particularly to penalize low-income
countries that tend to sign less liberal Air Services Agreements. They may be the
primary beneﬁciary of improved access to the international aviation market.
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1.A Appendices to Chapter 1
1.A.1 Construction of the Factor Analysis Index (FAI)
We construct the Factor Analysis Index (FAI) following the approach introduced by
Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000). The seven indicators of liberalization iden-
tiﬁed in WTO (2006) are taken as the initial set of variables to which factor analysis
is applied. Table 1.10 provides the deﬁnition of each indicator. The most restrictive
and the most liberal provision within an indicator are associated with zero and one,
respectively.
Table 1.10: Deﬁnition of Indicators of Liberalization
Name of indicator Deﬁnition
Grant of rights categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1 depending on the number of
traﬃc rights (ﬁfth freedom, seventh freedom, and cabotage) provided by the agree-
ment (0 means that none of the traﬃc rights is provided, 1/3 refers to one traﬃc right
provided, 2/3 to two rights and 1 means that all three traﬃc rights are provided)
Capacity categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 or 1 depending on the capacity
clause (0 refers to predetermination, 1/4 to "other restrictive" regime, 2/4 to Bermuda
I, 3/4 to "other liberal" regime and 1 to free determination)
Pricing categorical variable that takes the values 0, 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8 or 1 depending on the
pricing regime (0 refers to dual approval, 3/8 to country of origin disapproval, 4/8 to
zone pricing combined with dual approval, 6/8 is associated with dual disapproval,
7/8 refers to zone pricing combined with dual disapproval and 1 refers to free pricing)
Withholding categorical variable that takes the values 0, 1/2 and 1 depending on the owner-
ship/withholding regime provided; when more than one regime is included, the less
restrictive one is considered (0 refers to substantial ownership and eﬀective control,
1/2 to community of interests and 1 to principal place of business regime)
Designation dummy variable that takes the value 1 if multiple designation of airlines is allowed
and 0 otherwise
Statistics dummy variable that takes the value 0 if a provision on the exchange of statistics is
included and 1 if the provision is absent
Cooperative arrangements dummy variable that takes the value 1 if cooperative arrangements are allowed and
0 otherwise
The factor analysis extracts two most relevant factors that together explain 68
percent of the overall data variation as depicted in Table 1.11. Factor 1 accounts
individually for more than 50 percent of data variability. The magnitude of its loadings
(in general larger than 0.5) shows that it is highly correlated with all indicators of
liberalization, but cooperative arrangements. Factor 1 therefore captures an overall
degree of liberalization of the agreement. The detection of one common factor for
most of the indicators results from strong correlations between them (in the range of
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0.30 and 0.82). Factor 2 explains only 16 percent of the data variability and its main
contribution to the overall variance is as an indicator for cooperative arrangements.
Table 1.11: The Statistical Index (FAI)
Factors Loadings and Weights
Factor 1 Factor 2 Total
Explained variance 52% 16% 68%
Eigenvalues 3.64 1.10
Indicators of liberalization Loadings Weights Loadings Weights Weights
Grant of Rights 0.89 0.22 -0.07 0.00 0.17
Capacity 0.89 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.17
Pricing 0.91 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.18
Withholding 0.68 0.13 -0.05 0.00 0.10
Designation 0.50 0.07 0.35 0.11 0.08
Statistics 0.72 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.11
Cooperative arrangements 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.83 0.19
Weights of factors 0.77 0.23 1
Notes: Factor loadings were obtained by the principal component method and after varimax rotation.
Source: ICAO (2005) and WTO (2006, 2007).
We assign a weight to each indicator of liberalization and factor according to the
proportion of the variance that is explained by the indicator/factor. More formally, if
i denotes an indicator of liberalization and wi its weight, j a factor and Wj its weight,
Vij a weight of indicator i within a factor j and Tj =
∑7
k=1 loading2kj, then
Vij =
loading2ij
Tj
, Wj =
Tj
T1 + T2
, and wi = Vi1W1 + Vi2W2.
Free Sky and Clouds of Restrictions 32
1.A.2 Air Services Liberalization by Country
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Angola 1 0.67 15 0.08
Papua New Guinea 2 3.60 6 0.06
Mozambique 3 3.67 5 0.06
Burkina Faso 4 3.71 14 0.07
China 5 3.73 13 0.07
Georgia 6 3.83 20 0.08
Sao Tome and Principe 7 4.00 17 0.08
Lesotho 7 4.00 1 0.05
Central African Republic 9 4.25 16 0.08
Yemen 10 4.33 9 0.07
Ukraine 11 4.53 39 0.10
Togo 12 4.62 2 0.05
Niger 13 4.63 19 0.08
Moldova 14 4.71 32 0.10
Iran, Islamic Rep. Of 15 4.74 18 0.08
Kazakhstan 16 4.83 38 0.10
Cameroon 17 4.89 22 0.08
Zimbabwe 17 4.89 37 0.10
Bahamas 19 5.00 118 0.19
Solomon Islands 19 5.00 8 0.07
Fyr Macedonia 21 5.27 48 0.11
Kuwait 22 5.35 7 0.07
Bangladesh 23 5.50 21 0.08
Zambia 24 5.60 28 0.09
Seychelles 25 5.70 11 0.07
Israel 26 5.72 36 0.10
Russian Federation 27 5.78 56 0.12
Benin 28 5.81 44 0.11
Oman 29 5.82 29 0.09
Kyrgyz Republic 30 5.93 46 0.11
Mauritius 31 5.94 12 0.07
Comoros 33 6.00 4 0.06
Guyana 33 6.00 3 0.06
Congo 33 6.00 34 0.10
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. Of 35 6.17 26 0.09
India 36 6.25 27 0.09
Kenya 37 6.32 10 0.07
Somalia 38 6.33 30 0.09
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 39 6.45 24 0.08
Algeria 40 6.47 51 0.12
Samoa 41 6.50 23 0.08
Uzbekistan 41 6.50 81 0.15
Bulgaria 43 6.57 49 0.12
Côte D'ivoire 44 6.64 25 0.09
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 45 6.67 66 0.14
Burundi 45 6.67 41 0.11
Cuba 47 6.68 35 0.10
Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 6.75 60 0.13
Vietnam 48 6.75 59 0.13
Senegal 50 6.76 47 0.11
Romania 51 6.78 42 0.11
Saudi Arabia 52 6.95 50 0.12
Mauritania 53 7.00 58 0.12
Albania 54 7.14 116 0.19
Nigeria 55 7.20 31 0.09
Fiji 56 7.22 43 0.11
Equatorial Guinea 57 7.25 67 0.14
Croatia 57 7.25 71 0.14
Afghanistan 59 7.29 65 0.14
Pakistan 60 7.34 33 0.10
Ethiopia 61 7.43 40 0.10
Mexico 62 7.44 123 0.20
Serbia and Montenegro 63 7.58 100 0.17
Tanzania 64 7.62 75 0.15
Azerbaijan 65 7.67 117 0.19
Morocco 66 7.84 64 0.14
Mali 67 7.86 74 0.15
Iraq 68 7.98 55 0.12
Saint Kitts and Nevis 69 8.00 94 0.16
Chad 69 8.00 52 0.12
Maldives 71 8.08 61 0.13
Turkmenistan 72 8.13 104 0.17
Belarus 73 8.15 76 0.15
Malawi 74 8.19 54 0.12
Thailand 75 8.40 53 0.12
Guinea-Bissau 77 8.50 78 0.15
Bahrain 77 8.50 82 0.15
Philippines 77 8.50 95 0.16
Colombia 79 8.55 125 0.20
Korea, Republic of 80 8.58 72 0.14
Argentina 81 8.58 83 0.15
Tonga 82 8.67 45 0.11
Bolivia 83 8.69 86 0.16
Myanmar 84 8.73 68 0.14
South Africa 85 8.73 91 0.16
Gabon 86 8.75 77 0.15
Tunisia 87 8.78 114 0.18
Turkey 88 8.89 99 0.17
Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela 89 8.93 89 0.16
Armenia 90 9.00 80 0.15
Syrian Arab Republic 91 9.03 121 0.20
Guinea 92 9.06 90 0.16
Cambodia 93 9.07 85 0.16
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Egypt 94 9.08 69 0.14
Congo, Dem. Republic of 95 9.08 79 0.15
Jordan 96 9.29 115 0.19
Barbados 97 9.38 92 0.16
Qatar 98 9.42 108 0.17
Botswana 99 9.44 124 0.20
Sri Lanka 100 9.48 88 0.16
Canada 101 9.51 97 0.17
Lebanon 102 9.68 102 0.17
Nepal 103 9.75 73 0.15
Malaysia 104 9.79 87 0.16
Bhutan 105 10.00 62 0.13
Djibouti 105 10.00 62 0.13
Tuvalu 105 10.00 70 0.14
Suriname 105 10.00 57 0.12
Paraguay 105 10.00 122 0.20
Ecuador 110 10.08 120 0.19
Sudan 111 10.09 106 0.17
Brazil 112 10.17 103 0.17
Uganda 113 10.20 112 0.18
Mongolia 114 10.22 111 0.18
Costa Rica 115 10.25 142 0.27
Sierra Leone 116 10.38 93 0.16
Australia 117 10.38 84 0.16
Liberia 118 10.42 119 0.19
Ghana 119 10.46 98 0.17
Uruguay 120 10.47 96 0.16
Indonesia 121 10.52 105 0.17
Brunei Darussalam 122 10.74 113 0.18
Japan 123 10.80 107 0.17
Peru 124 10.93 133 0.23
Cape Verde 125 11.00 140 0.27
Trinidad and Tobago 125 11.00 110 0.18
United Arab Emirates 127 11.10 128 0.21
Dominican Republic 128 11.25 138 0.25
Jamaica 129 11.32 132 0.23
Cook Islands 130 11.33 101 0.17
Rwanda 131 11.40 134 0.23
Guatemala 132 11.43 135 0.24
Panama 133 11.75 143 0.27
Madagascar 134 11.80 139 0.25
Hong Kong, China 135 11.98 109 0.18
Saint Lucia 136 12.00 126 0.20
Namibia 136 12.00 149 0.30
Nicaragua 138 12.20 137 0.25
Singapore 139 12.29 127 0.21
Vanuatu 140 13.00 136 0.24
Gambia 140 13.00 144 0.27
Swaziland 143 14.00 129 0.22
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
ALI FAI
Country rank average rank average
Antigua and Barbuda 143 14.00 129 0.22
Haiti 143 14.00 129 0.22
New Zealand 145 15.68 147 0.28
Nauru 146 15.75 146 0.28
American Samoa 147 16.00 141 0.27
Honduras 147 16.00 163 0.42
Chile 149 16.08 158 0.35
Macao, China 150 16.61 145 0.28
Switzerland 151 16.93 148 0.29
Austria 152 17.42 152 0.31
Marshall Islands 153 17.67 155 0.32
Germany 154 17.77 151 0.31
Netherlands 155 17.83 154 0.32
Spain 156 17.98 153 0.32
Grenada 157 18.00 150 0.31
United Kingdom 158 18.93 157 0.34
Belgium 159 19.17 156 0.33
France 160 20.13 159 0.35
Sweden 161 21.53 160 0.38
Italy 162 22.78 161 0.41
Czech Republic 163 22.93 164 0.42
Denmark 164 23.09 162 0.41
El Salvador 165 23.50 177 0.60
Norway 166 24.20 166 0.44
Cyprus 167 24.90 165 0.43
United States 168 24.96 176 0.60
Poland 169 26.65 167 0.47
Finland 170 26.75 168 0.48
Greece 171 28.67 169 0.50
Portugal 172 28.87 171 0.52
Hungary 173 28.89 170 0.51
Luxembourg 174 30.57 172 0.55
Malta 175 32.92 173 0.59
Slovenia 176 33.74 174 0.60
Latvia 177 33.75 175 0.60
Aruba 178 34.00 183 0.80
Netherlands Antilles 178 34.00 183 0.80
Ireland 180 35.00 178 0.63
Lithuania 181 35.55 179 0.63
Slovak Republic 182 35.88 180 0.64
Iceland 183 39.06 181 0.71
Estonia 184 41.43 182 0.74
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1.A.3 Data Sources
Data on distance, common border, common colonial link and common language were
obtained from CEPII (2008). Data on GDP are based on the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2008b) and trade data are extracted from
the WITS - UN COMTRADE database (World Bank, 2008c). The deﬁnition of time-
sensitive sectors is based on the US imports obtained from the Global Trade Atlas
(Global Trade Information Services, 2009) (see Table 1.12 for the full listing of the
time-sensitive sectors). The grouping of countries by level of income is in line with
the World Bank deﬁnition (World Bank, 2008a). Data on passenger traﬃc and the
existence of direct services between two countries are provided by the International
Aviation Transport Association (IATA). Information on the agreements and the num-
ber of years since they were ﬁrst signed come from the World's Air Services Agreements
(WASA) database provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO,
2005). This database covers 2204 bilateral Air Services agreements, but only 1921 of
these are used, since the rest are covered by plurilateral agreements. Information on
plurilateral agreements was obtained from WTO (2007). In particular, we include the
Air Transport Agreement between EU and Switzerland and the Agreement on the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA) involving the EU (25) countries, Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein. We ignore other plurilateral agreements because their eﬀective imple-
mentation is improbable (see WTO, 2007, Chap. I for more details). The informed
index of air transport liberalization, the ALI, is from WTO (2006, 2007). All data
collected are for the year 2005.
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Table 1.12: Time-sensitive Sectors
Code Name Share of US
imports via air
71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, precious metals;
precious metal clad metals, articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin
87%
97 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 84%
50 Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof 82%
30 Pharmaceutical products 76%
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof 73%
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, med-
ical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
62%
43 Furskins and artiﬁcial fur; manufactures thereof 59%
6 Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut ﬂowers and orna-
mental foliage
59%
29 Organic chemicals 58%
93 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof 53%
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and
reproducers, television recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories
46%
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 40%
Notes: The data refer to the US imports from the rest of the world. HS 2005 classiﬁcation at the two-digit level is used.
Source: Global Trade Atlas (Global Trade Information Services, 2009).
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Chapter 2
Are the Central European Stock
Markets Still Diﬀerent?
A Cointegration Analysis
2.1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crises has rapidly developed and spread from the United States to
other parts of the world. This points to the risks of the global ﬁnancial sector, where
shocks are easily transmitted from one country to another. Therefore, it is of particular
interest to understand the process of ﬁnancial integration, investigate its underlying
linkages, and identify its drivers.
The transition economies in Central Europe1 oﬀer a unique opportunity to study
the eﬀects of institutional changes on ﬁnancial integration. First of all, many sub-
stantial legal and institutional reforms have been occurring in the Central Euro-
pean countries since the fall of communist regimes in 1989. The countries quickly
embarked on programs of liberalization and privatization and their economies have
undergone a relatively fast and successful transition process from centrally planned
economies towards free markets. Second, an important role in the transition pro-
cess has been played by large capital inﬂows to the region from developed coun-
tries. The Central European countries have attracted particularly signiﬁcant amounts
of foreign direct investment (FDI), originating mainly from Western Europe (see
1The term "Central Europe" refers to the Visegrád Group of countries, namely the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
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Mora, Garibaldi, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer, 2002).
Furthermore, the institutional arrangements as well as ﬁscal and monetary policies
have been strongly motivated by several criteria that set conditions for the European
Union (EU) accession and have directed the adjustment of the Central European coun-
tries towards the EU standards since the mid 1990s.2 The EU accession per se on
May 1, 2004 was associated with the full removal of restrictions on movements of cap-
ital. Nevertheless, the restructuring process continues as policy makers in the new
member countries attempt to join the Eurozone (McKinnon, 1999; Buiter and Grafe,
2002; Buiter, 2004),3 and the institutional changes are accompanied by a convergence
in macro-economic fundamentals of the recent EU members to the EU standards
(Kocenda, Kutan, and Yigit, 2006).
The ongoing institutional integration of the Central European countries with
the global economy, the importance of foreign investment in these countries and
their macro-economic developments suggest tightening of the stock market relations,
as evidenced by extensive empirical literature on major developed stock markets
(see Eun and Shim, 1989; Koch and Koch, 1991; Taylor and Tonks, 1989; Kasa, 1992;
Masih and Masih, 1992; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Bessler and Yang, 2003). In partic-
ular, ﬁnancial integration of the Central European markets with the "old" EU4 mar-
kets can be expected due to the EU enlargement as well as signiﬁcant capital inﬂows
to Central Europe from these countries. Surprisingly, the existing empirical litera-
ture on the Central European stock markets has delivered no (Gilmore and McManus,
2002, 2003) or only limited evidence (Egert and Kocenda, 2007; Syrioupoulus, 2006;
Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2009) for such developments so far, when focusing on the
long-run stock market linkages. In fact, this literature does not typically investigate
the developments of the long-run relations; rather, it tends to ﬁt only one model for
the whole period of interest, tacitly assuming that the parameters of the model are
constant over the whole time span. One exception is Voronkova (2004), who controls
for structural breaks in the relations and indeed ﬁnds stronger evidence of long-run
links than reported in the previous literature.
My approach follows Voronkova's work by assuming a priori that the characteris-
2Hungary and Poland applied for the EU membership in 1994, followed by Slovakia in 1995 and
the Czech Republic in 1996.
3Slovakia already adopted the Euro on January 1, 2009.
4The "old" EU refers to the EU-15 and comprises the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
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tics of the linkages are likely to change. Therefore, I pay particular attention to the
stability of the detected relations. I further extend the assumption of potential changes
in the model and consider varying number of existing relations. In particular, I expect
emergence of new long-run linkages related to the EU accession of the Central Euro-
pean countries in 2004. For this purpose, I compare the period before and after the
EU enlargement5 and ﬁnd ﬁrst strong evidence for increased stock market integration
between the Central European markets and the developed markets associated with the
EU accession. Moreover, the expected major role of the "old" EU in the integration
process is conﬁrmed by the results.
More speciﬁcally, my analysis concentrates on the three largest Central European
markets: the Czech, Hungarian and Polish markets.6 The "old" EU is used as their
mature counterpart. To capture other potentially inﬂuential stock market movements,
the United States (US) and the Russian market are added to the analysis as well. The
US market obviously represents the largest developed stock market in the world. The
inclusion of the Russian market, on the contrary, characterizes the development in the
largest emerging market in Europe with strong historical links to the Central European
countries.
To model the long-term trends in the stock market co-movements, I use the Jo-
hansen cointegration method in its multivariate setting. Although this method enables
the analysis of both the long-run and the short-run market structure, I focus on the
long-run. The reasons are threefold. First, the potential long-run relations can be in-
terpreted as equilibrium relations between asset prices and hence are a good measure of
the degree of market integration. The asset prices may deviate from each other in the
short run, but they will return to the equilibrium as a result of ﬁnancial integration.
Second, portfolios designed using only short-run correlations may not properly estimate
the long-term gains. In fact, the standard risk-return analysis using the mean-variance
approach ignores the long-term trends, since these are lost as the data are diﬀerenced.
However, in case of tightening long-run linkages among the markets, potential beneﬁts
from international portfolio diversiﬁcation can substantially decrease. Therefore, the
long-run relations are of particular interest for stock market investors acting interna-
tionally. Finally, the estimates of the long-run relations within the Johansen cointegra-
5Similar approach was used by Jochum, Kirchgassner, and Platek (1999) andYang, Hsiao, Li, and
Wang (2006) to study the eﬀects of the Russian ﬁnancial crises.
6The Slovakian stock market is not considered because of its minor size. For instance, its market
capitalization was approximately ten times smaller than that of the Czech stock market in 2007
(Standard & Poor's, 2008).
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tion framework are more reliable than the estimates of the short-run structure because
the convergence to their true values is faster (Juselius, 2007, p. 230).
The proper use of the cointegration technique relies on several assumptions, such
as constancy of parameters or independence of residuals. Surprisingly, the literature
applying this technique to the stock markets do not typically report any tests of these
assumptions. I attempt to overcome this crucial shortcoming. As already addressed,
I check the assumption of constant parameters by several recursive tests to detect
possible structural changes and to avoid the distortion of the results by assumption
violation. The stability of the relations is surely also a key issue for a plausible portfolio
design. Furthermore, I carefully handle the assumption of independently and normally
distributed residuals and, if necessary, I model too-large residuals caused by extraordi-
nary shocks such as the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001 by inclusion of proper
dummy variables. In addition, I explicitly address the question of which markets are
signiﬁcantly involved in the long-run relations, which is also a commonly neglected,
though very important, issue.7
In this way, I provide evidence for a similar degree of cointegration among the
three Central European markets in both periods, before and after the EU enlargement.
Nevertheless, no long-run linkages between the Central European markets and the two
developed markets or the Russian market can be detected in the period before the
enlargement. On the contrary, two new relations which link the Central European
markets to the other markets emerge after the EU enlargement. In particular, one
of these relations is identiﬁed as a "new EU relation", linking the movements of the
Central European markets to the "old" EU.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
developments of the three largest Central European markets. Section 2.3 introduces
the data and provides basic descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 explains the methodolog-
ical approach. Two models for the pre- and post-accession period are estimated and
compared in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6 concludes.
7A detection of a cointegration relation in a multivariate setting does not necessarily mean that
a long-run equilibrium relation between the Central European and other markets exists. It might be
the case that the relation involves only two markets - in an extreme case the two developed markets
of Western Europe and the US. Hence, the study of Syllignakis and Kouretas (2009) involving seven
Central and Eastern European markets and two developed markets does not deliver a clear picture of
which of these markets are inter-linked.
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2.2 Development of the Central European Stock Mar-
kets
After the collapse of communist regimes, the transition process of the Central European
countries was accompanied by the establishment of stock markets. The ﬁrst stock
exchange in the region was reopened in Hungary in July 1990. In the next two years,
the stock exchanges in Poland (1991) and in the Czech Republic (1992) started to
operate as well. Consequently, all three markets underwent considerable growth in
their size.
Market capitalization grew relatively steadily in Hungary and Poland from around
ﬁve percent of GDP in 1995 to 34 percent of GDP in Hungary and nearly 50 percent
of GDP in Poland in 2007 (see Table 2.1). The EU accession in 2004 seems to have
accelerated the growth of the markets since the market capitalization nearly doubled in
this year in both markets. The development in the Czech market reveals a somewhat
diﬀerent scenario. The high rates of market capitalization and the large number of listed
companies in the early stage of the transformation process reﬂect to a large extent the
eﬀects of a privatization program that was carried out in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (see
Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar, 2009). After the large waves of privatization, the
size of the stock market even decreased, but it started to considerably grow again in
2001. Following the scenario of the other two markets in the region, the Czech market
experienced a steep jump in size in 2004. In 2007, the market capitalization of the
Prague stock exchange accounted for more than 40 percent of GDP.
Compared to the developed markets, the rates of market capitalization in percent
of GDP are still rather low, but they are signiﬁcantly catching up.8 The liquidity of
the Central European stock markets appears to already be quite comparable to that
of the developed markets. This is reﬂected by relatively high turnover ratios that even
exceeded 100 percent in Hungary (2007) and in the Czech Republic (2005). The lower
turnover ratios in Poland are similar, for instance, to turnover ratios in Austria, which
have typically stayed below 50 percent in recent years (Standard & Poor's, 2008).
But who invests in the Central European markets, the domestic or the foreign
investors? Are the stock markets of the Central European countries developed enough
8The market capitalization in 2006 represented 57, 59, 148, and 160 percent of GDP for Germany,
Austria, the US, and the United Kingdom, respectively (Standard & Poor's, 2008).
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to attract signiﬁcant foreign capital?
In general, the Central European countries have been receivers of large capital
inﬂows from developed countries. The capital ﬂows to these countries constituted
around ﬁve to six percent of their GDPs in the period between 19931999. The main
source of foreign ﬁnancing was direct investment, followed by portfolio investment (see
Mora, Garibaldi, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer, 2002; Koeke and Schroeder, 2003). In 1995,
for instance, Hungary attracted the largest amount of FDI per capita of any country
outside the developed market economies, and as a result, the share of FDI in its GDP
exceeded ten percent (Lankes and Stern, 1999). Most of the capital ﬂows to Central
Europe originated in Western European countries such as Germany or Austria (Marin,
2004). Direct investment from Germany accounted for about one third of cumulative
FDI to the broader Eastern European region by 1996, and its majority indeed ﬂew to
Central Europe.
Nevertheless, foreign investment ﬁgures in Table 2.1 indicate that foreigners indeed
also held signiﬁcant amounts of stock market assets (other than FDI-related holdings).9
In 2007, the value of foreign investment in stock market assets represented around eight
percent of GDP in the Czech Republic and Poland and even eleven percent of GDP in
Hungary. Especially in Hungary, foreign investment has constituted around 40 percent
of market capitalization in recent years, which even exceeds foreign ownership holdings
in some of the developed markets.10
Foreign investment followed the scenario of market capitalization and experienced
a sharp one-time increase in 2004. This is very likely a result of increased conﬁdence
and willingness of foreign investors to participate in the Central European markets
associated with the accession of the countries to the EU in 2004. From a legal point
of view, the stock markets had already been open to foreign investors prior to the EU
accession. The restrictions on foreign investment were gradually lifted between 1994
to 1999 (see Dvorak and Podpiera, 2006; Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2009). However,
the increased interest of foreigners after the EU accession indicates that some foreign
investors may have refrained from the markets before the EU enlargement in particular
because of institutional or political risk.
9I follow the work of Koeke and Schroeder (2003) and use the international investment position
in equity securities from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2008b, 2009, line 79 ldd) for
measuring foreign investment in the stock markets. This approach might underestimate the true
holdings by foreigners, as some equity holdings are part of FDI.
10The corresponding ﬁgures for Austria, Germany, and the US in 2006 were 45, 37, and 14 percent,
respectively.
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The developments of the Central European markets appear to be signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced by their accession to the EU in May 2004. Around this date, a sharp increase
in the size as well as in the attractiveness of the markets to foreign investors can be
observed. I turn to investigate in the following whether this date also meant stronger
integration of the markets into the global economy.
2.3 Data
For capturing the stock market movements, I collected data of weekly closing price
indices for the three Central European markets, the Western European market, and
the US and Russian markets. All the data have been obtained from the Thompson
Financial Datastream database. To avoid the distorting eﬀects of using diﬀerent types
of local stock market indices for the emerging markets, the standardized IFC Investable
(IFCI) indices are used for representing the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Russian
markets. Moreover, these indices are designed to feature the type of assets that are
legally and practically available to a foreign portfolio investor. Since stronger linkages
between the recent and the "old" EU members are expected, the Western European
countries are of particular interest for analysis. The limitations regarding a reasonable
number of markets in the cointegrated VAR model suggest including only a single
representative of the Western European market; thus, the DJ Stoxx 600 is used. The
S&P 500 is chosen to represent the US market.
Following Jochum, Kirchgassner, and Platek (1999) and Voronkova (2004), all in-
dices are measured in local currency.11 The data are converted to the natural logarithms
and denoted by LCZ, LHN , LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU for the Czech, Hungarian,
Polish, Western European, US, and Russian markets, respectively.
The data were collected for the time period between October 30, 1998, and May 4,
2007. The end of the period is limited by the data availability when starting the anal-
ysis, but the sample period still covers three years after the EU enlargement on May 1,
2004. The choice of the start of the period is motivated ﬁrst by the attempt to avoid
the distorting impacts of the emerging market crises in 1997/1998 and the Russian
ﬁnancial crises in August/September 1998 and second by the intention to obtain a pe-
riod of three years before the EU enlargement when the accession date was still unclear.
11In case of the DJ Stoxx 600, the currency used is Euro.
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Although the accession negotiation for all of the three investigated Central European
countries had already been opened, on March 31, 1998, a signiﬁcant turning point in
the negotiations appeared to be November 2001. In this month, the European Commis-
sion announced the EU enlargement in its Annual Progress Reports on Enlargement
and provided a timetable for the enlargement (see Dvorak and Podpiera, 2006). Since
then, foreign investors anticipated that the three Central European countries would
enter the EU in 2004. Figure 2.1 shows that a signiﬁcant rise in the Central European
market prices can be observed after this date, whereas the developed markets did not
follow this pattern.
Figure 2.1: Logarithms of the Stock Market Indices
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Notes: LCZ, LHN , LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU stand for the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western European, US, and
Russian indices, respectively.
The timing of the two inﬂuential events  the announcement of the EU enlargement
and the EU enlargement per se  led me to the decision to split the data into three
periods:
• the pre-accession period, from October 30, 1998, to November 2, 2001 (three
years),
• the accession period, from November 3, 2001, to April 30, 2004 (two and a half
years),
• the post-accession period, from May 1, 2004, to May 4, 2007 (three years).
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Since the accession to the EU is to a large extent a gradual process, the accession
period is viewed as a transition period, in which the long-run equilibrium relations are
likely to be unstable, modiﬁed or changed. Therefore, I investigate this period only
marginally and focus rather on the comparison of the pre- and post-accession periods.
Using weekly data, both the pre- and the post accession periods cover exactly 158
observations and thus are well comparable.12
The logarithmic transformation enables the interpretation of the ﬁrst diﬀerences as
continuous stock market returns. Table 2.2 provides means and standard deviations
of the return series in the pre- and post- accession periods. Except for Russia, all
means are higher in the post-accession period, though the increase is never found to
be statistically signiﬁcant. Regarding the standard deviations, the volatility of all the
markets in the post-accession period is signiﬁcantly lower and indicates a more stable
situation in all the markets.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Stock Market Returns
Pre-accession period Post-accession period T-test for diﬀerence
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D.
Czech Republic 0.00074 0.034 0.0057 0.031 0.18 0.09
Hungary 0.00094 0.046 0.0051 0.035 0.37 0.00
Poland 0.00045 0.042 0.0048 0.029 0.30 0.00
Russia 0.01139 0.082 0.0048 0.040 0.37 0.00
West Europe 0.00092 0.028 0.0030 0.015 0.43 0.00
US 0.00010 0.030 0.0018 0.014 0.53 0.00
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations (S.D.) of the continuous (log) return series in the pre- and post- accession
periods. In the last two columns, p-values of the t-test for diﬀerence in means and standard deviations of the two periods are reported.
The post-accession period is also characterized by higher correlations among the
return series, as evidenced in Table 2.3. This suggests that the short-run linkages
among the markets are stronger after the EU enlargement as the markets became more
synchronized. Surprisingly, a signiﬁcant increase occurred, especially in the correlations
between the Central European markets and the Russian market, but not between the
Central and Western European markets. However, the correlations with the Russian
market started at very low levels in the pre-accession period, which might still reﬂect a
rather non-standard behavior of the Russian market after the ﬁnancial crises in 1998.
12The time span of three years is similar to the lengths of periods used in other studies (e.g.,
Jochum, Kirchgassner, and Platek, 1999; Yang, Hsiao, Li, and Wang, 2006) that also analyze long-
run stock market equilibrium relations.
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Table 2.3: Correlations of the Stock Market Returns
Pre-accession period Post-accession period
CZE HUN POL RUS WE US CZE HUN POL RUS WE US
CZE 1 1
HUN 0.54 1 0.59 1
POL 0.49 0.52 1 0.58 0.72 1
RUS 0.23 0.31 0.27 1 0.52 0.55 0.48 1
WE 0.40 0.54 0.47 0.34 1 0.50 0.51 0.57 0.44 1
US 0.23 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.74 1 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.36 0.76 1
Notes: The table shows correlations of the continuous (log) return series in the pre- and post- accession periods. CZE, HUN, POL,
RUS, WE, and US stand for Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, Western European, and US markets, respectively. Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
correlations (at a 10 percent level) between the two periods are indicated by boldface.
2.4 Methodology
For modeling the long-run relationships among the stock markets, I apply the coin-
tegrated VAR model introduced by Johansen (1991). This method is very applicable
for my type of data because it is speciﬁcally designed for non-stationary stochastic
processes, and stock market prices are indeed usually integrated of order one (I(1)
hereafter). The stock market indices chosen follow this pattern, as indicated by Fig-
ure 2.1 and by the results of the augmented Dickey Fuller tests.13
The cointegration method assumes that the time series can be modeled by a VAR(k)
model. Denoting the vector of the six stock market indices in logarithms in period t
by X t, this means that
X t = Π1X t−1 + · · ·+ΠkX t−k + εt, where εt ∼ IN 6(0,Ω) (2.1)
and t = 1, . . . , T.
Hence, the error terms εt are assumed to be independently normally distributed with
a constant variance-covariance matrix. To meet these assumptions, I use weekly fre-
quency data rather than daily data. The reason is that the lower-frequency data suﬀer
less from the "stylized facts" of the ﬁnancial time series such as heavy-tailed distribu-
tions or ARCH eﬀects. Moreover, the information loss due to the lower frequency is not
very important in the cointegration framework, since the length of the period, and not
13I conducted the univariate augmented Dickey Fuller tests with a constant and with a constant
and a time trend, both for lag 1 to 3. In particular, the tests applied on the return series revealed that
the data in levels are at most I(1) and thus suitable for cointegration analysis in the I(1) framework.
This pattern was later conﬁrmed when analyzing the multivariate models.
Are the Central European Stock Markets Still Different? 52
the frequency, is important for the detection of the long-run relations. Furthermore,
the disturbing eﬀects of diﬀerent market closing times (European vs. Russian vs. US
market) are eliminated.
A more convenient way of working with the VAR(k) model in the cointegration
framework is to rewrite the model in the vector equilibrium correction model (VECM)
form:
∆X t = ΠX t−1 + Γ1∆X t−1 + · · ·+ Γk−1∆X t−k+1 + εt, (2.2)
where ∆X t =X t −X t−1, Π = −(I −
k∑
j=1
Πj), Γi = −
k∑
j=i+1
Πj,
and I denotes the identity matrix. This representation allows one to directly deal
with the non-stationary pattern in the data that is now concentrated exclusively in
ΠX t−1, as it is the only term in levels in Equation (2.2). So the Π matrix captures all
information about the long-run eﬀects, and its rank r cannot be full. Supposing that
the rank were full, a stationary process ∆X t would be equal to a non-stationary term
ΠX t−1 (plus several stationary terms), which leads to a contradiction. Hence, Π can
be partitioned as
Π = αβ′,
where α and β are 6 × r matrices and r < 6. The rank r (or the cointegration
rank) can be determined using the trace test, also called the Johansen test. This
procedure discriminates between (r) signiﬁcant and (6 − r) insigniﬁcant eigenvalues
λi, i = 1, . . . , 6, on which the maximum likelihood estimation of the model is based
(see Johansen, 1996, Chapter 6). Consequently, each signiﬁcant eigenvalue is related
to one stationary cointegration relation, which can be viewed as a long-run equilibrium
relation among the markets. The r stationary relations are represented by β′X t−1. The
coeﬃcients of α capture the adjustment of markets to the cointegration relations and
are called loadings. The Γi matrices contain information about the short-run linkages.
The model can be extended by the inclusion of deterministic components (a con-
stant, a deterministic trend or diﬀerent dummy variables) that are partitioned into
those restricted to enter only the cointegration relations and the unrestricted ones (see
Juselius, 2007, Chapter 6). My modeling strategy is to allow for a relatively rich struc-
ture at the beginning of the analysis. Hence, I include an unrestricted constant and,
eventually, unrestricted dummy variables. The time trend is restricted to enter only
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the cointegration relations to avoid a quadratic trend in the level data.14 Later on, I try
to reduce the rich model into a more parsimonious one by examining the signiﬁcance
of the corresponding coeﬃcients.
In general, the stability of the model can be investigated by several recursive tests.
The idea is to choose a baseline period (e.g., the ﬁrst year), on which the ﬁrst model is
estimated, and then recursively test whether additional observations follow the same
model. In this way, I study the constancy of β and signiﬁcant λi estimates as well as
the stability of the full model using the log-likelihood function. In addition, I check
the validity of imposed restrictions throughout the diﬀerent time periods.
A useful tool for the recursive tests of constancy is to distinguish between two types
of α and β estimates, the ﬁrst based on the VECM ("X-form") and the others based
on the concentrated model ("R-form"). The latter model is motivated by the idea
of the Frisch-Waugh Theorem (Frisch and Waugh, 1933) and enables the obtaining of
"cleaner" estimates of the long-run structure after the short-run dynamics and the
deterministic components have been concentrated out (see Juselius, 2007, Chapter 7).
In particular, if the constancy of the "X-form" coeﬃcients is rejected as opposed to the
"R-form" coeﬃcients, the non-stability is likely to come from the short-run structure.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Pre-accession Period
I start with the estimation of the VAR(k) model using data for the pre-accession
period. The basic model includes an unrestricted constant, a restricted trend, but
no dummy variable. As a starting point, I use a lag length of 3. The theoretical
speciﬁcation in Equation (2.1) requests two residual assumptions, namely normality
and independence. The results of misspeciﬁcation tests indicate that both assumptions
are clearly violated for this basic model. To improve the model speciﬁcation, I include
several dummy variables, which turned out to be economically relevant as well as
statistically signiﬁcant.
14Although a quadratic trend could improve the ﬁt within the sample, it would lead to the implau-
sible economic result that the stock markets follow quadratic trends.
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• An unrestricted transitory shock dummy for the ﬁrst two weeks in January 1999
(January 8 and 15)15 is related to a stock market over-reaction after the introduc-
tion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999 in most of
the "old" EU countries. It corrects particularly for the volatile behavior of the
Western European markets in the ﬁrst two weeks in January.
• An unrestricted blip (impulse) dummy on April 14, 200016 captures a temporal
drop of the US market following the burst of the dot-com bubble. Therefore,
the corresponding coeﬃcient is highly negatively signiﬁcant especially for the US
market.
• Three unrestricted blip dummy variables for three weeks after the September 11
terrorist attacks (September 14, 21, and 28, 2001) account for the substantial
market instability, mainly in the US market, followed by the Western European
markets.
Furthermore, I exclude insigniﬁcant short-run coeﬃcients and thus adjust the lag length
of the model. The resulting model meets the required assumptions and is used in the
following (see Appendix 2.A.1 for a more detailed discussion on the speciﬁcation of the
model).
As an indicator for the number of cointegration relations, I use the trace test (Ta-
ble 2.4). Since the model contains a trend in the cointegration relation and several
dummy variables, I do not report the results of the standard test; instead, I simulate
an asymptotic trace test distribution by the program developed in Nielsen (2004). The
results suggest rank 1, because H0 : r = 0 is rejected, but H0 : r = 1 cannot be rejected.
In addition, the graphical analysis of the ﬁrst cointegration relation in Figure 2.3 in
Appendix 2.A.2 proposes stationarity. Hence, the evidence suggests the existence of
one long-run equilibrium relation among the indices in the pre-accession period.
After the rank determination, I examine the stability of the model. All tests of
constancy in Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 shown in Appendix 2.A.3 suggest a good stability
of the model. In particular, Figure 2.7 conﬁrms constancy of the long-run equilibrium
relation. Due to the satisfactory results of these tests, further adjustment of the model
such as inclusion of structural breaks does not seem to be necessary.
15A transitory dummy is modeled by the inclusion of dtr = (. . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . .) to the explanatory
variables in the VECM form. 1 and -1 correspond to January 8 and 15, respectively. For more details
on the dummy variables, see Juselius (2007, Chapter 6).
16An impulse dummy is modeled by the inclusion of dp = (. . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .), where 1 corresponds to
April 14.
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Table 2.4: Trace Test for the Pre-accession Period
H0 : Eigenvalue Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
r=0 0.27 121.7 111.2 108.7 0.01 0.03
r=1 0.15 72.2 65.4 82.3 0.23 0.47
r=2 0.12 46.5 38.7 59.5 0.40 0.76
Notes: The results of the asymptotic trace test and corresponding eigenvalues are reported. A length of 158 random walks (the same as
the length of the sample) and 5000 replications were used for the simulation. Frac95 denotes the 95% quantile from the simulated trace
test distribution. Trace* and P-Value* refer to the results of a small sample Bartlett correction introduced in Johansen (2002).
I turn now to the question of whether the cointegration relation involves all the
markets simultaneously or only some of them. In particular, I am interested whether
the cointegration relation links the Central European markets to the other markets
such as the Western European market, thereby suggesting the integration of these
markets. A test of exclusion clearly indicates that this is not the case, since the Western
European, US, and Russian markets can be individually (Table 2.5) as well as jointly
(H1 in Table 2.6)17 excluded from the cointegration relation, contrary to the Central
European markets. This means that the cointegration relation detected involves only
the three Central European markets and that there are no long-run linkages to their
mature counterparts or the Russian market in the pre-accession period.
Table 2.5: Tests of Restrictions on β and α in the Pre-accession Period
Test DF CV LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS
Exclusion 1 3.84 23.13 4.86 19.67 0.28 0.08 0.02
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.60) (0.78) (0.89)
Unit vector 5 11.07 7.82 42.18 27.46 34.41 35.37 35.65
in α (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table reports likelihood ratio test statistics of exclusion restrictions on β (H0 : β1,i = 0 for a particular market i) and of unit
vector in α (H0 : αi,1 = 0 for all i except one) under the rank 1 assumption. LCZ, LHN , LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU stand for
the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western European, US, and Russian indices, respectively. All the test statistics are χ2
distributed, DF denotes the degree of freedoms and CV the corresponding 5% critical value. P-values are reported in the parentheses.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients under H1 in Table 2.6 lead me to further test for
the price homogeneity of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian markets, denoted by H2.18
The accepted homogeneity means that a common stochastic trend exists that drives
the markets to move in the same direction by a similar amount.19 This is particularly
inconvenient for the stock market investors, as the portfolio diversiﬁcation among the
17H1 : β1,LRU = β1,LWE = β1,LUS = 0
18H2 : β1,LCZ +β1,LHN +β1,LPO = 0 & β1,LRU = β1,LWE = β1,LUS = 0. The time trend, though
very small in magnitude, is signiﬁcant, and its exclusion is rejected.
19This interpretation can be derived from the MA representation of the model (see also Juselius,
2007, Chapter 14).
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three Central European markets is strongly limited. I also examine the stationarity
of the spread between the Czech and Polish market (H3).20 The result suggests that
(LCZ−LPO) can be regarded as stationary, which implies a strong integration of the
two markets and even no beneﬁts of portfolio diversiﬁcation between them in the long
run.21 The reason is that under this scenario, the two markets are driven by exactly
one common stochastic trend, which pushes them to move in the same direction and
by the same amount, meaning that they follow on average the same random walk.
Nevertheless, H3 implies the exclusion of the Hungarian market, which is in conﬂict
with the test for individual exclusion of the Hungarian market. Moreover, the p-value
of the test for H3 is quite low compared to the test for H2. Therefore, I consider the
homogeneity restrictions in H2 to be more plausible than the spread restrictions, and
I use them in the following.
Table 2.6: Estimates of β under Diﬀerent Restrictions
in the Pre-accession Period
Test LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS trend DF χ2 p-value
H1 1 -0.23 -0.74 0 0 0 -0.00 3 0.95 0.81
H2 1 -0.22 -0.78 0 0 0 -0.00 4 0.88 0.93
H3 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 6 7.20 0.30
Notes: The table presents the estimated coeﬃcients under diﬀerent restrictions on β and the results of likelihood ratio test statistics
of these restrictions. LCZ, LHN, LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU stand for the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western
European, US, and Russian indices, respectively. All the test statistics are χ2 distributed. DF denotes the degree of freedoms.
The analysis of the long-run relation captured by β does not indicate which of the
markets are adjusting to the cointegration relation and which are following only their
own stochastic trends. For this, the α coeﬃcients are investigated. The tests for a unit
vector in α reported in Table 2.5 suggest that the Czech market can be considered the
only adjusting one. This means that shocks to the Czech market have no permanent
eﬀect on any market in the system, not even on itself, and that the "random walk"
movements of the Czech market are driven by permanent shocks to the other two
markets involved in the equilibrium relation.
This ﬁnding is not surprising, when considering that the Czech market in the pre-
accession period is the smallest of the three Central European markets and also the
most open to foreign capital (see Table 2.1). The diﬀerences are especially pronounced
when comparing the Czech and the Polish markets. In 2000, the capitalization of
the Polish stock market exceeded nearly three times the Czech market capitalization,
20H3 : β1,LCZ − β1,LPO = 0 & β1,LHN = β1,LRU = β1,LWE = β1,LUS = β1,trend = 0
21I also tested the stationarity of other market spreads, but none of them was found to be stationary.
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but only 17 percent of investment going to the Polish market originated abroad, in
contrast to 28 percent of foreign investment going to the Czech market. Hence, the
Polish market is much more likely to reﬂect only the local developments, and the Czech
market is adjusting accordingly. The importance of the Polish market to the Czech
market adjustment is also manifested by the large coeﬃcient of β1,LPO as compared to
β1,LHN and the borderline stationarity of the Czech-Polish spread.
The joint restrictions on α and β coeﬃcients (i.e., the unit vector in α for the Czech
market and the homogeneity restrictions H2 on β) are also not rejected, and the recur-
sive likelihood ratio test based on the "R-form" estimates indeed suggests a validity of
the imposed restrictions throughout the sample (see Figure 2.8 in Appendix 2.A.3).22
The ﬁnal estimates are summarized in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Final Model in the Pre-accession Period
Likelihood ratio test of the restricted model: χ2(9) = 8.14, p-value = 0.52
LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS trend
β′1 1 -0.27 -0.73 0 0 0 -0.00
(.) (-2.98) (-8.16) (.) (.) (.) (-2.57)
∆ LCZ ∆ LHN ∆ LPO ∆ LRU ∆ LWE ∆ LUS
α′1 -0.28 0 0 0 0 0
(-5.75) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Notes: The table reports the likelihood ratio test for the joint restrictions on α and β and the resulting coeﬃcients. The corresponding
t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and some of them are missing due to the imposed restrictions. LCZ, LHN, LPO, LWE, LUS and
LRU stand for the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western European, US, and Russian indices, respectively.
2.5.2 Accession Period
Having a reasonable model with one cointegration relation for the pre-accession period,
the applicability of the model can be tested also for the following period, the accession
period. For this, I conduct a recursive test of H0 : β = "known β". This test pro-
vides evidence for whether the cointegration relation found in the pre-accession period
remains similar in the accession period as well. Therefore, the "known β" refers to
the estimated β based on the pre-accession period and, consequently, its similarity to
β coeﬃcients estimated for longer periods is tested. Figure 2.2 shows that the cointe-
gration relation from the pre-accession period persisted for approximately one year in
22The rejection of the restrictions for the shortest subsamples using the "X-form" appears to be
caused by the instability of the short-run coeﬃcients (e.g., Γ1 and Γ2) and thus does not indicate a
serious distortion of the results for the long run.
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the accession period and that later on, around November 2002, the relation changed
permanently. Hence, no clear support for a dramatic change in the cointegration rela-
tion due to the EU enlargement announcement in November 2001 is delivered by this
test. Nevertheless, a permanent change occurred later in the accession period, and the
timing of the change corresponds roughly to the end of the admission negotiations on
December 13, 2002.
Figure 2.2: Test of β = "known β" in the Accession Period
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
2002
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
X(t)
R1(t)
5% C.V. (12.6 = Index)
Notes: The "known β" estimates are based on the pre-accession period. The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection
line.
2.5.3 Post-accession Period
Similarly to the pre-accession period, the residuals of the basic VAR(3) model for the
post-accession period do not meet all the required assumptions. The diﬃculties can
be solved by the inclusion of the following unrestricted blip dummy variables, which
account for the largest residuals in the model.
• Blip dummies for three weeks (March 18, October 14, November 11) in 2005
correct for the temporal instability in the Czech and Hungarian market.
• Four blip dummies (May 19, June 9, 16, 30) in 2006 account for the high volatil-
ity in the emerging markets. The volatility appears to be a result of a sharp
correction in the price of riskier assets after almost three years of signiﬁcant
gains.
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• One blip dummy in March 2, 2007 captures a global downturn of all the markets
following a sharp fall of China's domestic stock markets.
Having included these dummies, the lag length 1 in the VAR model turns out to be
suﬃcient for modeling the short-run dynamics and the resulting model appears to be
reasonably speciﬁed (for more details see Appendix 2.A.1).
The simulated values for the trace test in Table 2.8 indicate cointegration rank 2
at a 5 percent conﬁdence level and rank 3 at a 10 percent conﬁdence level. Moreover,
considering a very small diﬀerence in magnitude between the second (0.17) and third
eigenvalue roots (0.16), it seems reasonable to prefer rank 3 to rank 2. Furthermore,
Figure 2.4 in Appendix 2.A.2 suggests stationarity of the third long-run equilibrium
relation and, therefore, cointegration rank 3 is chosen.
Table 2.8: Trace Test for the Post-accession Period
H0 : Eigenvalue Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value*
r=0 0.22 125.9 123.5 108.1 0.00 0.00
r=1 0.17 87.7 86.3 81.4 0.02 0.02
r=2 0.16 58.4 57.8 59.6 0.06 0.07
r=3 0.10 31.7 31.5 40.5 0.27 0.29
Notes: The results of the asymptotic trace test and the corresponding eigenvalues are reported. The simulation framework is the same
as for the pre-accession period, i.e., a length of 158 random walks (the same as the length of the sample) and 5000 replications were used.
Frac95 denotes the 95% quantile from the simulated trace test distribution. Trace* and P-Value* refer to the results of a small sample
Bartlett correction introduced in Johansen (2002).
Several recursive tests are again conducted to check the assumption of constant
parameters. The tests for constancy of the log-likelihood function and of the β param-
eters (see Figures 2.9 and 2.11 in Appendix 2.A.3) do not indicate a violation of the
constancy assumption. However, the development of eigenvalues in Figure 2.10 in Ap-
pendix 2.A.3 clearly detects non-constancy, particularly in the two largest eigenvalues
corresponding to the ﬁrst two stationary relations. This in turn indicates non-constant
α parameters.23 Therefore, I cannot consider the estimates of α to be reliable and
concentrate only on the examination of the β coeﬃcients.
Compared to the pre-accession period, the higher number of stationary relations
suggests stronger integration among the six markets in general. However, it is not
clear whether new relations between the Central European and the Western Euro-
pean markets emerged or whether the linkages among the Central European markets
23Since the eigenvalues are linear functions of the corresponding α and β parameters and the
constancy of β parameters is not violated, the rejection occurs due to the non-constant α parameters.
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strengthened, and it is not clear which role is played by the other markets, the US and
the Russian markets. To learn more about this, the long-run structure needs to be
identiﬁed.
As a starting point, the tests of exclusion in Table 2.9 show that no market can
be excluded from all three cointegration relations simultaneously, meaning that each
market is involved in at least one cointegration relation.
Table 2.9: Tests of Exclusion Restrictions on β in the Post-accession
Period
Test DF CV LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS
exclusion 3 7.81 10.81 9.33 17.19 14.44 14.93 16.68
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: The table reports likelihood ratio test statistics of exclusion restrictions on β under the rank 3 assumption. The null hypothesis
is β1,i = β2,i = β3,i = 0 for a particular market i. LCZ, LHN , LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU stand for the logarithms of the Czech,
Hungarian, Polish, Western European, US, and Russian indices, respectively. The test statistics are χ2 distributed, DF denotes the degree
of freedoms and CV the corresponding 5% critical value. P-values are reported in the parentheses.
An interesting question arises in relation to the pre-accession period, namely,
whether the same or a similar cointegration relation can be found among the Cen-
tral European markets in the post-accession period as well. Therefore, I test for joint
exclusion of all the non-Central European markets from a single relation, and it is not
rejected, as shown in Table 2.10 under H1. The homogeneity of the Central European
markets under H2 is also not rejected, thought the estimated coeﬃcients are very dif-
ferent from those in the pre-accession period. The change in β coeﬃcients is in line
with the ﬁnding for the accession period that the estimated β from the pre-accession
period do not remain constant. In particular, the importance of the Hungarian market
has increased at the expense of the Polish market, and there is even some evidence
for spread stationarity between the Czech and Hungarian markets (H3), provided that
the time trend is included. This indicates, on the one side, a very strong link between
the Czech and Hungarian markets that signiﬁcantly limits the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
in the post-accession period, as the two markets share one common driving trend. On
the other side, the diversiﬁcation possibilities between the Czech and Polish market
have increased compared to the pre-accession period, as their spread is not found to
be stationary anymore, and the markets follow diﬀerent paths.24
I prefer the initial cointegration relation under H1 to the restricted homogeneity
(H2) and spread (H3) relations due to the highest p-value. I regard this relation as
24Regarding other markets, stationarity of their spreads is always rejected, meaning that no other
markets are so strongly linked as the Czech and Hungarian market in the post-accession period.
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the ﬁrst identiﬁed cointegration relation in the model for the post-accession period
and label it the "Central European relation". This relation is irreducible in the sense
that it is not a linear combination of two "smaller" separate stationary relations. As
a result, both of the two remaining cointegration relations has to involve the non-
Central European markets. In fact, the rejection of joint exclusion of the three Central
European markets under H4 indicates that the two remaining cointegration relations
bridge the two groups of markets, the non-Central European and the Central European
markets, which is a new pattern arising in the post-accession period.
Table 2.10: Estimates of β under Diﬀerent Restrictions
in the Post-accession Period
Test LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS trend DF χ2 p-value
H1 1 -0.78 -0.57 0 0 0 0.00 1 0.59 0.44
H2 1 -0.81 -0.19 0 0 0 -0.00 2 2.25 0.32
H3 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -0.00 3 5.02 0.17
H4 0 0 0 -0.08 1 -0.82 -0.00 1 5.01 0.03
H5 -1.05 0.87 0 0 1 0 -0.00 1 0.01 0.92
H6 -1 0.82 0 0 1 0 -0.00 2 0.01 0.99
Notes: The table presents the estimated coeﬃcients under diﬀerent restrictions on β and the results of likelihood ratio test statistics
of these restrictions. LCZ, LHN, LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU stand for the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western
European, US, and Russian indices, respectively. All the test statistics are χ2 distributed. DF denotes the degree of freedoms.
Since I expect that the Central European markets are particularly linked to the
Western European markets after the EU accession, I look for a stationary relation
involving some of these markets. One convenient candidate for such a relation con-
sists of that between the Czech, Hungarian and Western European markets (H5) be-
cause of its high p-value.25 The p-value even increases by the additional restriction
β2,LCZ = −β2,LWE under H6. Since the joint hypothesis for H6 and the "Central Eu-
ropean relation" in H1 is also not rejected (χ2(3) = 2.26 with a p-value of 0.52), the
relation under H6 is included in the cointegration space and labeled as the "new EU
relation". It clearly captures a new linkage between the Central European and the
Western European markets that emerged in the post-accession period and could not
be detected in the pre-accession period. The fact that the relation includes the Czech
and Hungarian markets but not the Polish one can be explained by the two smaller
countries' higher openness towards foreign capital and stronger trade integration with
the EU. For instance, Czech and Hungarian exports to the EU in the post-accession
25Note that the exclusion of LRU and LUS from a single relation is trivial and leads to a just-
identiﬁed relation in the model achieved by rotation of the cointegration space, but not by testable
over-identifying restrictions.
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period account for more than 50 and 40 percent of their GDPs, respectively, compared
to less than 25 percent reported for Poland (IMF, 2008a).
As there is no economic prior for the third relation, it is just-identiﬁed by the
exclusion of the Czech and the Hungarian market and links the Polish market to the
non-Central European markets.26 The resulting estimate of the whole β matrix is
reported in Table 2.11. Although the third cointegration relation also contains the
Russian market, and although the market cannot be excluded according to the t-test,
the estimated coeﬃcient of β3,LRU is relatively small.27 This suggests a rather minor
importance of the Russian market in the long-run structure. Even in the case that the
Russian market represented an important driving force in the model, the deviations
from the long-run equilibrium relations due to the Russian market movements would
not be very large.
Table 2.11: Final Model in the Post-accession Period
Likelihood ratio test of the restricted model: χ2(3) = 2.27, p-value = 0.52
LCZ LHN LPO LRU LWE LUS trend
β′1 1 -0.77 -0.63 0 0 0 0.00
(.) (-13.50) (-7.90) (.) (.) (.) (2.00)
β′2 -1 0.82 0 0 1 0 -0.00
(.) (13.94) (.) (.) (.) (.) (-4.03)
β′3 0 0 -0.36 -0.05 1 -0.35 -0.00
(.) (.) (-5.61) (-5.12) (.) (-7.90) (-1.54)
Notes: The table reports the likelihood ratio test for the over-identifying restrictions on β, the resulting coeﬃcients as well as their
t-statistics in the parentheses. Some t-statistics are missing due to the imposed restrictions. LCZ, LHN , LPO, LWE, LUS, and LRU
stand for the logarithms of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Western European, US, and Russian indices, respectively.
To check the stability of the imposed over-identifying restrictions, I again conduct a
recursive likelihood ratio test. The joint restrictions in Table 2.11 seem to be plausible
for most of the subsamples, as can be seen in Figure 2.12 in Appendix 2.A.3. The only
problematic period appears in August 2005, when the restrictions are rejected. But as
this is only borderline and temporary, the detected instability is not serious.
26Note that just-identiﬁcation of the third cointegration relation can generally be achieved by
the exclusion of any market pair from the group of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and the Western
European market. Hence, the relation represents a linkage among all the markets.
27The relatively small size of β3,LRU is also found under the other identiﬁcation schemes.
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2.5.4 Robustness Checks
To see if important information is lost by using weekly instead of daily data, I replicate
the models with the Tuesday closing prices instead of the Friday closing prices. I adjust
only the inclusion of dummies. For instance, since September 11, 2001 was Tuesday,
the corresponding dummy is shifted 3 days ahead from Friday to Tuesday. The results
show that the cointegration rank and the identiﬁed long-run relations are robust to the
day of the week used in both the pre- and post-accession periods. More speciﬁcally,
the same restrictions on the β coeﬃcients are not rejected, and the magnitudes of
the estimated coeﬃcients remain similar. Certain diﬀerences are found only in the
estimated α coeﬃcients, since the Hungarian market in the pre-accession period is
suggested to be adjusting to the long-run relation in addition to the Czech market.
Considering the similarity of the Hungarian and Czech markets in terms of their size
and openness, this ﬁnding appears to be plausible and underlines the importance of
Polish market movements for the whole Central European region. The α estimates
in the post-accession period are found to be unstable as in the case of the Friday
data. To further investigate the choice of the data, I also use data in US dollars
instead of the local currencies. My analysis conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Yang et al. (2006),
Koch and Koch (1991) and Bessler and Yang (2003) that the results do not depend
substantially on the currency used. In particular, the number of detected equilibrium
relations is found to be the same regarding both periods.
As a last robustness check, I examine alternative model speciﬁcations. Including
the three dummies for the instability after September 11, 2001, the characteristics of
the long-run relation in the pre-accession period do not substantially depend on the
lag length of the model or on additional dummies used. Nevertheless, the results for
the post-accession period are found to be more sensible to the choice of lag length
or the inclusion of dummy variables. Under alternative model speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd
stronger support for preferring rank 2 to rank 3 according to the trace test. The two
equilibrium relations detected still bridge the Central European and the non-Central
European markets, but the "pure Central European relation" is no longer found to be
stationary. Hence, the main result that new linkages between the Central European
and the other markets emerge in the post-accession period remains unchanged. On
the contrary, the degree of cointegration between the Central European markets seems
to decrease using some of the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. However, most of these
speciﬁcations seriously violate the residual or constancy assumptions and thus does not
appear to be reliable. The detected diﬀerences in the results deliver further evidence
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about the importance of fulﬁlled model assumptions for statistical inference.
2.6 Conclusions
The Central European countries have been the leaders of the transition process from
centrally planned towards free market economies. A substantial role in the process of
transition has been played by developed countries, especially those in Western Europe.
For instance, large capital inﬂows, especially in the form of FDI, have represented
one important channel for tightening economic relations. Consequently, the Central
European countries became members of the EU in May 2004.
This study shows that the EU accession resulted also in stronger ﬁnancial inte-
gration of these countries with the global economy in general and with the "old" EU
countries in particular. Based on a cointegration analysis applied on stock market
movements, this is evidenced by the emergence of two new equilibrium relations in
the post-accession period that link the movements of the Central European markets to
the movements of the Western European, US, and Russian markets, whereas no such
relations can be detected before the EU enlargement. One new long-run relation could
be identiﬁed as the "new EU relation" because it connects the developments of the
Czech and the Hungarian market to the development of the Western European market
representing the "old" EU. The accepted exclusion of the Polish market from this re-
lation can be explained by less openness towards foreign investment and weaker trade
integration of the Polish market with the EU compared to the two smaller Central
European markets. The second new equilibrium relation represents a linkage among
the Western European, US and Russian markets as well as the Central European mar-
kets, though the role of the Russian market is found to be relatively limited. Hence,
the existence of the relation points to the importance of the US stock market to the
Central European markets, in addition to the inﬂuence from the Western European
market, detected after the EU enlargement.
Considering only the three Central European markets, their degree of integration is
found to be the same in the period before and after the EU enlargement, since I detect
one cointegration relation linking the three Central European markets in both periods.
However, the characteristics of the relation changed over time. Between November
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1998 and October 2001, this relation can be characterized by a strong adjustment of
the Czech market to movements of the Polish market. Using an alternative day of the
week, I also ﬁnd some evidence for adjustment of the Hungarian market to the Polish
market movements. These results suggest a major importance of the Polish market for
the Central European region before the EU enlargement. This is not surprising as the
Polish market represented the largest stock market in the region, whose movements
were likely to reﬂect especially local market events, because only a relatively low frac-
tion of investment to the market originated abroad. Nevertheless, the characteristics of
the relation changed permanently around November 2002, which roughly corresponds
to the end of the EU admission negotiations on December 13, 2002. In particular, the
importance of the Polish market is indicated to be smaller after the EU accession in
2004, since a strong link between the Czech and Hungarian markets is found. Con-
sidering the rich long-run structure in the post-accession period, the Polish market as
an initial driving force of the "Central European relation" in the pre-accession period
was likely to be substituted later on by the stochastic trends of the mature markets,
in particular by the Western European market. Unfortunately, recursive tests of pa-
rameter constancy detect serious instability of the α coeﬃcients, which impedes the
conﬁrmation of this hypothesis by the data.
This study ﬁnds evidence for a signiﬁcantly stronger ﬁnancial integration of the
Central European markets with the global economy after the EU enlargement in 2004,
particularly with the "old" EU. I have shown that new long-run linkages between the
Central European markets and the developed markets in Western Europe and the US
emerged after the EU accession, though no such relation could be found before the
EU enlargement. The increased linkages among the markets mean that the Central
European stock markets became more vulnerable to shocks hitting developed economies
on the one hand but more resistant to shocks originating domestically on the other
hand. From the perspective of stock market investors, the results suggest that the
beneﬁts of long-run portfolio diversiﬁcation between the developed and the Central
European markets were reduced.
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2.A Appendices to Chapter 2
2.A.1 Model Speciﬁcations
Pre-accession Period
As shown in Table 2.12, the normality of the residuals is clearly rejected for the ba-
sic VAR(3) model in the pre-accession period without any dummy variables.28 The
assumption of independent residuals implies no autocorrelation. This is violated for
model with lag 2, but not with lag 3 and 1. Furthermore, the tests for ARCH eﬀects
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in second moments and detect het-
eroscedasticity in the residuals for every lag length reported. Moreover, several large
standardized residuals (over 3.5) could be detected. Therefore, the speciﬁcation of the
model is not satisfactory and the situation does not improve when additional lags are
included.
Table 2.12: Misspeciﬁcation Tests
Pre-accession period Post-accession period
Test DF Basic model Adjusted model Basic model Adjusted model
Normality: 12 62.3 (0.00) 17.2 (0.14) 29.1 (0.00) 14.0 (0.30)
Autocorrelation:
LM(1): 36 44.8 (0.15) 34.1 (0.56) 39.1 (0.33) 35.6 (0.49)
LM(2): 36 56.3 (0.02) 34.3 (0.55) 31.4 (0.69) 36.0 (0.47)
LM(3): 36 41.1 (0.26) 33.7 (0.58) 31.8 (0.67) 34.0 (0.56)
ARCH eﬀects:
LM(1): 441 545.7 (0.00) 516.1 (0.01) 485.9 (0.07) 364.7 (0.99)
LM(2): 882 1038.6 (0.00) 943.4 (0.07) 1059.8 (0.00) 905.8 (0.28)
LM(3): 1323 1519.1 (0.00) 1479.3 (0.00) 1487.6 (0.00) 1319.2 (0.52)
Notes: The table reports misspeciﬁcation tests for multivariate normality proposed in Doornik and Hansen (2008) (H0 : normality),
Lagrange Multiplier tests for autocorrelation (H0 : no autocorrelation) as well as ARCH eﬀects (H0 : no autocorrelation in second
moments) in the residuals for models with one to three lags (Anderson, 2003; Rao, 1973). All the test statistics are χ2 distributed. DF
denotes degree of freedom. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Adjusted model refers to the model with dummies (and, in addition,
with speciﬁc lag length in the pre-accession period). The results of tests for the models used for the cointegration analysis are indicated
by boldface.
Working with ﬁnancial data, we cannot expect to entirely get rid of the heavy-
tailed (non-normal) distribution as well as the strong ARCH eﬀects. This is not a
crucial obstruction, since the estimates of the VAR model are generally robust to
28The usual 5% signiﬁcance level is used for all conducted tests, when not stated diﬀerently.
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deviations from normality (Juselius, 2007, page 128) and presence of ARCH eﬀects
(Gonzalo, 1994; Lee and Tse, 1996). However, appropriate dummy variables might
mitigate autocorrelation by the elimination of large residuals and improve the skewness
and kurtosis of the residual distribution. Therefore, I include several dummies, as listed
in Section 2.5.1.
I further adjust the lag length of the model. Generally, it is set to 3, because no
autocorrelation in residuals is rejected for the VAR(2) model, but not for the VAR(3)
model. A longer lag structure appears to be redundant, and a shorter structure is
rejected by the tests for lag reduction. Nevertheless, the examination of the coeﬃcients
of the Γ1 and Γ2 matrices in the VECM speciﬁcation29 indicates that the columns
Γ1,LRU ,Γ2,LWE and Γ2,LUS contain only insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients and can be individually
as well as jointly excluded. For instance, the likelihood ratio test statistic of the joint
hypothesis of exclusion is LR = 2(3333.8 − 3322.7) = 11.1, which is smaller than the
critical value χ20.95(18) = 28.9. Therefore, I use this more parsimonious structure of
lags.
The misspeciﬁcation tests for the resulting model (Table 2.12, Adjusted model)
show that both no autocorrelation and normality of the residuals have improved sub-
stantially. Hence, the extended model is preferred to the basic one.
Post-accession Period
The basic VAR model for the post-accession period surprisingly does not suﬀer from
autocorrelation in residuals (using any lag of 1 to 3). However, non-normality, ARCH
eﬀects and large residuals are still detected (Table 2.12, Basic model). The inclusion
of the dummies introduced in Section 2.5.3 improve the model substantially (see Ta-
ble 2.12, Adjusted model). Furthermore, the lag length is set to 1 for two reasons.
First, the likelihood ratio tests for reducing lag length from 3 to 1 (χ2(72) = 82.9 with
a p-value 0.18) and from 2 to 1 (χ2(36) = 39.98 with a p-value 0.30) do not reject the
hypothesis of the sub-model with lag length 1. Second, the misspeciﬁcation tests for
this model do not detect any residual autocorrelation, non-normality or even presence
of ARCH eﬀects and thus the model is used for the following cointegration analysis.
29Note that the lag length of 3 in the VAR form corresponds to the lag length of 2 in the VECM
form and, thus, to only two "Γ" matrices.
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2.A.2 Cointegration Relations
Figure 2.3: The First Cointegration Relation in the Pre-accession Period
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the ﬁrst cointegration relation in the pre-accession period in the "X-form" (upper part)
and "R-form" (lower part).
Figure 2.4: The Third Cointegration Relation in the Post-accession Period
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the third cointegration relation in the post-accession period in the "X-form" (upper
part) and "R-form" (lower part).
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2.A.3 Constancy of Parameters
Figure 2.5: Test for Constancy of Log-likelihood Function
in the Pre-accession Period
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5% C.V. (1.36 = Index)
Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection
line indicate no violation of the constancy assumption. The line of R1(t) refers to the concentrated model in
the "R-form".
Figure 2.6: Development of the First Eigenvalue
in the Pre-accession Period
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Notes: The dashed lines refer to 5 % conﬁdence bounds. If the eigenvalue lies within the narrowest conﬁdence
bounds, the assumption of the eigenvalue's constancy is not violated.
Are the Central European Stock Markets Still Different? 70
Figure 2.7: Test of β constancy in the Pre-accession Period
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N
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5% C.V. (3.49 = Index)
Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection
line indicate no violation of the constancy assumption. The line of R1(t) refers to the concentrated model in
the "R-form".
Figure 2.8: Likelihood Ratio Test of Restrictions
in the Pre-accession Period
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Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection
line indicate that the imposed restrictions are not rejected. The line of R1(t) refers to the concentrated model
in the "R-form".
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Figure 2.9: Test for Constancy of Log-likelihood Function
in the Post-accession Period
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
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5% C.V. (1.36 = Index)
Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection line indicate
no violation of the constancy assumption. Due to lag length of 1 in the VAR model (i.e. zero lag in the VECM form), the
test statistics for the "X-" and "R-form" are the same.
Figure 2.10: Development of the Three Eigenvalues
in the Post-accession Period
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Notes: The dashed lines refer to 5 % conﬁdence bounds. If the eigenvalue lies within the narrowest conﬁdence bounds, the
assumption of the eigenvalue's constancy is not violated.
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Figure 2.11: Test of β constancy in the Post-accession Period
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
2005 2006
0.00
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R1(t)
5% C.V. (5.36 = Index)
Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection line indicate
no violation of the constancy assumption. The line of R1(t) refers to the concentrated model in the "R-form".
Figure 2.12: Likelihood Ratio Test of Restrictions
in the Post-accession Period
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
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Notes: The scaling of the test is consistent, with 1 being the 5 % rejection line. The values under the rejection line indicate
that the imposed restrictions are not rejected. Due to lag length of 1 in the VAR model (i.e., zero lag in the VECM form),
the test statistics for the "X-" and "R-form" are the same.
References
Anderson, T. W., 2003. An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis, 3rd Edi-
tion. John Wiley and Sons.
Bessler, D. A., Yang, J., 2003. The Structure of Interdependence in International Stock
Markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 22, 261287.
Buiter, W., 2004. To Purgatory and Beyond: When and How Should the Accession
Countries from the Central and Eastern Europe Become Full Members of the EMU?
CEPR Discussion Paper 4342, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Buiter, W., Grafe, C., 2002. Anchor, Float or Abandoned Ship: Exchange Rate
Regimes for Accession Countries. CEPR Discussion Paper 3184, Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, London.
Doornik, J., Hansen, H., 2008. An Omnibus Test for Univariate and Multivariate Nor-
mality. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 70, 927939.
Dvorak, T., Podpiera, R., 2006. European Union Enlargement and Equity Markets in
Accession Countries. Emerging Markets Review 7 (2), 129146.
Egert, B., Kocenda, E., 2007. Interdependence between Eastern and Western European
Stock Markets: Evidence from Intraday Data. Economic Systems 31 (2), 184203.
Eun, C. S., Shim, S., 1989. International Transmission of Stock Market Movements.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 241256.
Frisch, R., Waugh, F., 1933. Partial Time Regressions as Compared with Individual
Trends. Econometrica 45, 939953.
Gilmore, C. G., McManus, G. M., 2002. International Portfolio Diversiﬁcation: US and
Central European Equity Markets. Emerging Markets Review 3, 6983.
Are the Central European Stock Markets Still Different? 74
Gilmore, C. G., McManus, G. M., 2003. Bilateral and Multilateral Cointegration Prop-
erties between the German and Central European Equity Markets. Studies in Eco-
nomics and Finance 21, 4053.
Gonzalo, J., 1994. Five Alternative Methods of Estimating a Long Run Relationship.
Journal of Econometrics 60, 203233.
Hanousek, J., Kocenda, E., Svejnar, J., 2009. Divestitures, Privatization and Corporate
Performance in Emerging Markets. The Economics of Transition 17 (1), 4373.
IMF, 2008a. Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook. Washington, DC.
IMF, 2008b. International Financial Statistics, Yearbook. Washington, DC.
IMF, 2009. International Financial Statistics, Monthly Issue June. Washington, DC.
Jochum, C., Kirchgassner, G., Platek, M., 1999. A Long-run Relationship between
Eastern European Stock Markets? Cointegration and the 1997/1998 Crises in Emerg-
ing Markets. Review of World Economics 135, 454479.
Johansen, S., 1991. Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models. Econometrica 59, 15511580.
Johansen, S., 1996. Likelihood Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive
Models, 2nd Edition. Advanced Texts in Econometrics. Oxford University Press.
Johansen, S., 2002. A Small Sample Correction of the Test for Cointegration Rank in
the Vector Autoregressive Model. Econometrica 70, 19291961.
Juselius, K., 2007. The Cointegrated VAR Model: Methodology and Applications.
Oxford University Press.
Kasa, K., 1992. Common Stochastic Trends in International Stock Markets. Journal of
Monetary Economics 29, 95124.
Kocenda, E., Kutan, A. M., Yigit, T. M., 2006. Pilgrims to the Eurozone: How far,
how fast? Economic systems 30, 311327.
Koch, P. D., Koch, T. W., 1991. Evolution in Dynamic Linkages across Daily National
Stock Indexes. Journal of International Money and Finance 10, 231251.
Koeke, J., Schroeder, M., 2003. The Prospects of Capital Markets in Central and
Eastern Europe. Eastern European Economics 41 (4), 537.
Are the Central European Stock Markets Still Different? 75
Lankes, H. P., Stern, N., 1999. Capital Flows to Eastern Europe. In: Feldstein, M.
(Ed.), International Capital Flows. National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 57
96.
Lee, T., Tse, Y., 1996. Cointegration Tests with Conditional Heteroscedasticity. Journal
of Econometrics 73, 401410.
Longin, F., Solnik, B., 1995. Is the Correlation of International Equity Returns Con-
stant? Journal of International Money and Finance 14, 326.
Marin, D., 2004. A Nation of Poets and Thinkers: Less So with Eastern Enlargement?
Austria and Germany. CEPR Discussion Paper 4358, Centre for Economic Policy
Research, London.
Masih, A. M. M., Masih, R., 1992. A Comparative Analysis of the Propagation of Stock
Market Fluctuations in Alternative Models of Dynamic Causal Linkages. Applied
Financial Economics 7, 5974.
McKinnon, R., 1999. Toward Virtual Exchange-rate Stability in Western and Eastern
Europe with the Advent of the EMU. In: Blejer, M. I., kreb, M. (Eds.), Balance of
Payments, Exchange Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies. Springer
United States, pp. 131158.
Mora, N., Garibaldi, P., Sahay, R., Zettelmeyer, J., 2002. What Moves Capital to
Transition Economies? IMF Working Papers 02/64, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
Nielsen, H. B., 2004. UK Money Demand 1873-2001: A Cointegrated VAR Analysis
with Additive Data Corrections. Discussion Papers 04-21, University of Copenhagen,
Department of Economics, Copenhagen.
Rao, C. R., 1973. Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications, 2nd Edition. John
Wiley and Sons.
Standard & Poor's, 2002. Emerging Stock Markets Factbook. New York.
Standard & Poor's, 2008. Global Stock Markets Factbook. New York.
Syllignakis, M. N., Kouretas, G. P., 2009. German, US and Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Stock Market Integration. Open Economies Review, Online First.
Do Multinationals Transplant their Business Model? 76
Syrioupoulus, T., 2006. Risk and Return Implications from Investing in Emerging
European Stock Markets. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions
and Money 16, 283299.
Taylor, M. P., Tonks, I., 1989. The Internationalisation of Stock Markets and the
Abolition of U. K. Exchange Control. The Review of Economics and Statistics 71,
332336.
Voronkova, S., 2004. Equity Market Integration in Central European Emerging Mar-
kets: A Cointegration Analysis with Shifting Regimes. International Review of Fi-
nancial Analysis 13, 633647.
Yang, J., Hsiao, C., Li, Q., Wang, Z., 2006. The Emerging Market Crises and Stock
Market Linkages: Further Evidence. Journal of Applied Econometrics 21, 727744.
Chapter 3
Do Multinationals Transplant their
Business Model?∗
3.1 Introduction
Recent literature on international trade has established that the most productive ﬁrms
of a country tend to become multinationals.1 One reason is that more productive
ﬁrms appear to be better able to cover the large ﬁxed costs of entering a foreign
country. How much, however, of this productivity advantage of multinational ﬁrms
is translated to the host countries in which these ﬁrms invest? Marin (2004) ﬁnds
that German multinationals increase the productivity level of their subsidiaries in
Central Eastern Europe (including Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Union
countries) to, on average, 60 percent of their parent ﬁrms in Germany compared with
national ﬁrms in Central Eastern Europe which produce 23 percent of the productiv-
ity level of German ﬁrms during the late 1990s. Austrian multinationals in Eastern
Europe reach 32 percent of the productivity level of parent ﬁrms in Austria. Similarly,
Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2007) ﬁnd that US multinationals are more produc-
tive than non-US multinationals and national ﬁrms in the UK. They attribute this to
the better management practices and the more decentralized internal organization of
US ﬁrms (see Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen, 2009).
Figure 3.1, however, reveals a surprisingly wide variation in productivity levels of
German and Austrian subsidiaries in Eastern Europe relative to their parent ﬁrms
in Germany and Austria, suggesting that the ability of multinational ﬁrms to trans-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Dalia Marin, University of Munich.
1See Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004); Antras and Helpman (2004).
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plant their home productivity advantage to other countries is by no means secure.
The startling diﬀerences in productivity levels by the same ﬁrms across diﬀerent host
countries may be because of diﬀerences in the market and regulation environment that
multinationals face in host countries, or because of sectoral diﬀerences, or diﬀerences
in the ability of multinationals to transplant their business model to other countries.
If organizational capital is key to understanding ﬁrms' productivity performance, as
suggested by Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2007) and Marin and Verdier (2008a),
then the question arises as to what determines whether multinationals export their
business model to the countries they invest in.2
Figure 3.1: Productivity of Foreign Aﬃliates in Host Countries
in Percentage of Parent Firms
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Notes: The ﬁgures plot the productivity of foreign aﬃliates in host countries relative to Austrian and German parent ﬁrms, respectively,
in percentages. "Other former Soviet Union" refers to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan; and "Baltic states" to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The aggregation achieves at least eight observations
per bar.
To answer this question we need detailed information on the internal organization
of multinational parents and their subsidiaries. Therefore, we analyze unique matched
data of 660 parent ﬁrms in Austria and Germany with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Eu-
rope including Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Union countries. We designed
2Marin and Rousová (2009) indeed ﬁnd that subsidiaries tend to be more productive when they
use the same business model as their parent ﬁrms.
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and collected these data from a full population of ﬁrms in Austria and Germany in-
vesting in Eastern Europe in the years between 1990 and 2001. The sample represents
80 percent of German foreign direct investment and 100 percent of Austrian foreign
direct investment in Eastern Europe between 1998 and 2000.
As a measure of internal organization of parent and subsidiary ﬁrms we use the
level of decentralization of thirteen corporate decisions such as decisions on acquisi-
tions, new strategy, transfer prices or budget (see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2 for a
full list of corporate decisions for which we have information on the hierarchical level
at which these decisions are taken). Furthermore, we use two proxies for the trans-
plantation of business culture of multinationals to their subsidiaries, one via taking the
ﬁrm organization abroad and one via taking the CEO abroad. More speciﬁcally, we
use a similarity measure counting the number of corporate decisions which are taken at
the same hierarchical level in parent and subsidiary ﬁrms and we use the information
whether or not parent ﬁrms send one or more managers from the home country to run
the subsidiary.
Table 3.1 takes a ﬁrst look at whether or not multinationals in Austria and Germany
transplant their organization to the host countries. Some 50 per cent of multinationals
do not transplant (the responsibility for ﬁve or more corporate decisions is allocated to
diﬀerent hierarchical levels in subsidiaries compared with parent ﬁrms), 27 percent of
these ﬁrms transplant partially (the allocation of power diﬀers for two to four corporate
decisions between subsidiaries and parents) and 24 percent of ﬁrms transplant fully (all
corporate decisions have the same allocation in subsidiaries as in parent ﬁrms or the
allocation of one corporate decision diﬀers).
Furthermore, the table looks at whether the organizational mode of multinational
parent ﬁrms signiﬁcantly aﬀects their ability to transplant their organization to another
country. It appears that decentralized parent ﬁrms transplant their organization signif-
icantly more often than centralized parent ﬁrms. Some 37 percent of foreign aﬃliates
use the same business model as parent ﬁrms when their parent ﬁrms are decentralized
compared with 24 percent of subsidiaries for all parent ﬁrms and 67 percent of sub-
sidiaries use a diﬀerent business model from parent ﬁrms when their parent ﬁrms are
centralized compared with 50 percent of subsidiaries for all parent ﬁrms.
As a result the average levels of decentralization diﬀer between parent ﬁrms and
their subsidiaries as shown in Table 3.2, which looks at whether multinational parent
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Table 3.1: Transplantation via Organization
Subsidiaries with Parents' Organization All parent
Transplanted ﬁrms
Not1 Partially1 Fully1
Centralized3 290 69 77 436
Decentralization 66.5 % 15.8% 17.7% 32.7%
of Cooperative3 260 212 132 604
Parent Firm2 43.0% 35.1% 21.9% 45.2%
Decentralized3 112 74 109 295
38.0 % 25.1% 36.9% 22.1%
All subsidiary ﬁrms 662 355 318 1335
49.6% 26.6% 23.8% 100%
Notes: The table reports absolute number of cases and row percentages, except for the column "All parent ﬁrms", where column
percentages are given. The Person's χ2 test rejects the null hypothesis that the transplantation of the business model is independent of
the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms at any conventional signiﬁcance level (χ2(4) = 76.8, p-value = 0.000).
1 The degree of transplantation via organization (full, partial and no transplantation) depends on the number of corporate decisions
which are taken at the same hierarchical level in parent and subsidiary ﬁrms. For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in
Appendix 3.A.2. The organization is fully transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the subsidiary
ﬁrm as for the parent ﬁrm or if only one corporate decision diﬀers. It is partially transplanted if two to four corporate decisions diﬀer in
hierarchical rank and the organization is not transplanted if ﬁve or more corporate decisions are diﬀerent.
2 Mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters
of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the subsidiary manager for decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm or the divisional manager for decentralization of parent ﬁrm (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
3 A ﬁrm is centralized when the level of decentralization is in the range of 1.0 to 2.5, it is cooperative in the range of 2.51 to 3.5 and
decentralized in the range of 3.51 to 5.
ﬁrms and subsidiaries have a similar decision-making structure. On average parent
ﬁrms are more centralized than subsidiary ﬁrms. The table also shows that the level of
decentralization of parent ﬁrms has a strong inﬂuence on the way the level of command
is organized in subsidiaries. Centralized parent ﬁrms tend to have signiﬁcantly more
centralized subsidiaries and decentralized parents have signiﬁcantly more decentralized
subsidiaries. Some 58 percent of subsidiaries have centralized decision-making when
their parents are centralized compared with 27 percent of all subsidiaries and 42 percent
of subsidiaries with decentralized parents are decentralized compared with 22 percent
of subsidiaries for all parent ﬁrms.
These numbers suggest that multinationals are quite often able to imprint their busi-
ness culture on foreign aﬃliates. Nevertheless, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 reveal a startling
variation in the organization of subsidiaries across host countries. Foreign aﬃliates of
Austrian and German ﬁrms diﬀer substantially with respect to their level of decentral-
ization as well as in the degree to which they implement the business model of their
parent ﬁrms. This suggests that home countries diﬀer with respect to how attractive
the conditions in their markets are to ﬁrms with a foreign business culture wishing to
operate in their markets.
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Table 3.2: Level of Command of Parent and Subsidiary Firms
Decentralization of Subsidiary Firms1 All parent
Centralized2 Cooperative2 Decentralized2 ﬁrms
Centralized2 251 156 29 436
Decentralization 57.6 % 35.8% 6.7% 32.7%
of Cooperative2 104 363 137 604
Parent Firms1 17.2% 60.1% 22.7% 45.2%
Decentralized2 7 163 125 295
2.4% 55.3% 42.4% 22.1%
All subsidiary ﬁrms 362 682 291 1335
27.1% 51.1% 21.8% 100%
Notes: The table reports absolute number of cases and row percentages, except for the column "All parent ﬁrms", where column
percentages are given. The Person's χ2 test rejects the null hypothesis that the level of decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrms is independent
of the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms at any conventional signiﬁcance level (χ2(4) = 371.5, p-value = 0.000).
1 Mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters
of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the subsidiary manager for decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm or the divisional manager for decentralization of parent ﬁrm (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
2 A ﬁrm is centralized when the level of decentralization is in the range of 1.0 to 2.5, it is cooperative in the range of 2.51 to 3.5 and
decentralized in the range of 3.51 to 5.
Figure 3.2: Level of Decentralization of Parent Firms and their Aﬃliates
in Host Countries
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Notes: Level of decentralization is a mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions
depending on whether the headquarters of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the
subsidiary manager in host countries or the divisional manager in Austria or Germany (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2. "Other former Soviet Union" refers to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The aggregation achieves at least eight observations per
bar.
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Figure 3.3: Multinationals' Transplantation of Business Model
Figure 3.3a: Transplantation via Organization
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Figure 3.3b: Transplantation via CEO
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Notes to Figure 3.3a: Figures are given for full transplantation via organization in which either each corporate decision in subsidiaries has
the same rank as in parent ﬁrms or only one corporate decision diﬀers. For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
"Other former Soviet Union" refers to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. The aggregation achieves at least eight observations per bar.
Notes to Figure 3.3b: Figures are given for subsidiary ﬁrms to which at least one manager has been sent by the parent ﬁrm. "Other
Eastern Europe" refers to Albania, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; "other former Soviet Union" to Moldova, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan; "other former Yugoslavia" to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia; and "Baltic states" to Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. The aggregation achieves at least eight observations per bar.
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In this chapter, we examine the factors that determine whether or not multinationals
export their business culture to other countries. So far this has been little understood.
Previous research on organizations in international trade has focused on how ﬁrms'
home productivity advantage determines the mode of organization ﬁrms choose abroad
(Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Antras and Helpman, 2004) and how a greater
exposure to international trade inﬂuences the business model ﬁrms choose at home
(Marin and Verdier, 2004, 2007, 2008b). The research on the transportation of culture
across countries has so far not focused on ﬁrm organization but rather on whether the
fertility rates of second-generation immigrants in the US reﬂect the culture in the US or
that of their parents in their home country (Fernández and Fogli, 2009) or on parking
ﬁne behavior of diplomats (Fisman and Miguel, 2008).
More recently, empirical literature on ﬁrm decentralization has emerged with
a focus on national ﬁrms. The literature examines the trend of decentralization
of US ﬁrms (Rajan and Wulf, 2006) and how information technology (Acemoglu,
Aghion, Lelarge, van Reenen, and Zilibotti, 2007), international trade and competition
(Marin and Verdier, 2004, 2007; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2008), and trust and hierarchi-
cal religion (Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen, 2009) aﬀect the level of decentralization
of ﬁrms. The paper by Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2009) is the closest our analy-
sis, since their ﬁrm sample includes information on multinational ﬁrms. Their data on
multinationals, however, do not include matched parent and foreign aﬃliate informa-
tion, which is what we use in this chapter. Therefore, they are not able to answer how
the characteristics of parent ﬁrms and their country of origin are inﬂuencing the ability
of multinational ﬁrms to transport their business culture abroad. Our matched parent
and aﬃliate data sample allows us to quantify to what extent aﬃliates' organizations
reﬂect the cultural traits of their parents and to what extent they are a response to
the market environment subsidiary ﬁrms face in host countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the various
data used. In particular, it describes how we measure organization of multinational
ﬁrms and transplantation of their business culture to foreign aﬃliates. Section 3.3
examines the determinants of these two measures and their estimated eﬀects. Section
3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Data
We collected survey data for 660 multinational corporations in Austria (200) and Ger-
many (460) with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Europe including the former Soviet Union
countries during the period 1990 to 2001. The survey questions refer typically to the
years 1998 and 1999, when the data represented 100 percent of Austrian and 80 per-
cent of German direct investment in Eastern Europe. This dataset is unique, since it
includes matched information on the organization of 600 parent ﬁrms in Austria and
Germany and 2200 of their subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.3 In particular, we have
information about the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms and their subsidiaries
which is measured by the level of decision-making within the corporation. This in turn
enables us to study when the business model of parent ﬁrms is transplanted to their
subsidiaries.
3.2.1 Measuring Organization
Measuring Decentralization
Our measure of decentralization of parent ﬁrms is based on the survey question: "Who
decides on the following issues concerning your corporation: the headquarters or the
divisional manager?" The issues involve thirteen corporate decisions for Austrian and
German parent ﬁrms, i.e. decisions on acquisitions, ﬁnances, new strategy, wage in-
crease, R&D expenditure, budget, transfer and product prices, introducing a new prod-
uct, changing a supplier, hiring two and 20 new workers as well as a new secretary. See
also Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2 for the listing of the decisions. Responses ranged
between one and ﬁve with one as a centralized decision, taken entirely at headquarters,
and ﬁve as a decentralized decision, taken at the divisional level. We use a simple mean
of the available ranking to measure the overall level of decentralization of the ﬁrm and
call it the decentralization of parent ﬁrm. A counterpart, decentralization of subsidiary
ﬁrm, is obtained from answers to the question "Who decides on the following issues
concerning your corporation: the headquarters of the parent ﬁrm or the manager of
the subsidiary ﬁrm in the host country?"
3For a detailed overview of all variables and their descriptive statistics see Tables 3.12 and 3.13,
respectively, in Appendix 3.A.1.
Do Multinationals Transplant their Business Model? 85
Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2 shows that the most centralized decision is the decision
on acquisitions with a mean ranking of 1.34 and 1.41 for parent and subsidiary ﬁrms,
respectively, followed by the decision on a new strategy (with a respective mean ranking
of 1.90 and 1.88). Not surprisingly, the most decentralized decisions tend to be the
decision on hiring a secretary (mean ranking of 4.15 and 4.65) and the decision on
hiring two new workers, whereas the decision on R&D and the decision to introduce
a new product tend to be taken cooperatively between headquarters and subsidiary
managers in the host country (with a respective mean ranking of 2.58 and 2.80).
Measuring Transplantation
We use two indicators to proxy for the transplantation of the business model from
parent ﬁrms to foreign aﬃliates. The ﬁrst proxy is a dummy variable transplantation
via organization which indicates whether or not the organization of the parent ﬁrm is
fully transplanted to the subsidiary. It takes a value of one if each individual corporate
decision has the same hierarchical rank or if one of the decisions diﬀers in hierarchical
rank between parent and subsidiary ﬁrms.
Table 3.15 in Appendix 3.A.2 looks at the similarity in the hierarchical levels of
corporate decisions in parent and subsidiary ﬁrms. The hierarchical level ranges be-
tween one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) in subsidiaries and parent ﬁrms for
each of the corporate decisions individually. When parent and subsidiaries allocate
an individual decision at the same hierarchical level, we consider the decision to be
fully transplanted to the subsidiary and the similarity index in Panel A becomes zero,
otherwise it takes values in the interval (-4,4). We obtain this measure by subtracting
the hierarchical level of the subsidiary ﬁrm from that of the parent ﬁrm.
Panel A gives a quantitative measure of transplantation by providing the percent-
ages of subsidiaries where a particular decision is taken at the same hierarchical level
as in parent ﬁrms (= 0) and at diﬀerent hierarchical levels ( 6= 0). It shows that the
most centralized and the most decentralized corporate decisions tend to be transplanted
most often to foreign aﬃliates (compare Tables 3.14 and 3.15 in Appendix 3.A.2). In 78
percent, 70 percent, and 64 percent of the aﬃliates the decision on acquisitions, hiring
a secretary, and hiring two new workers, respectively, are taken at the same hierarchical
level in foreign aﬃliates as in parent ﬁrms. The least often transplanted decisions tend
to be in the middle of the corporate ladder such as the decision on ﬁnances and R&D.
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Only in about half of the aﬃliates are these two decisions at the same hierarchical level
in subsidiaries as in parent ﬁrms.
Panel B gives a qualitative measure of transplantation by listing in addition which
corporate decisions in the subsidiary are more (> 0) or less decentralized (< 0) than
in the parent ﬁrm. As can be seen from Panel B, when subsidiaries deviate in the
allocation of decision power from their parent ﬁrms they tend to decentralize more than
their parent ﬁrms. One exception is the decision on R&D which is more decentralized
in parent ﬁrms than in subsidiary ﬁrms. Of the 49 percent of foreign aﬃliates which
diﬀer in their allocation of decision power over R&D from their parent ﬁrms, 30 percent
of subsidiaries are more centralized compared with parent ﬁrms (< 0) and 19 percent
are more decentralized (> 0).
Finally, Panel C reports the degree of transplantation by listing the degree to which
the decisions in foreign aﬃliates deviate from their parent ﬁrms. When aﬃliates diﬀer
in their decision-making from their parent ﬁrms they do not choose a radical departure
from their parent ﬁrms. Mostly, they tend to decentralize or to centralize by one or
two hierarchical levels more compared with their parent ﬁrms.
As a second proxy for the transplantation of parent ﬁrms' business model we use a
dummy variable transplantation via CEO. It takes a value of one if at least one manager
is sent from the parent ﬁrm to the subsidiary in the host country. The idea here is that
parent ﬁrms use their own managers to implement the corporation's business culture
in the subsidiary abroad. The dummy is constructed from the survey question "How
many of your managers from the parent ﬁrm are sent to the subsidiary ﬁrm?" In more
than 40 percent of foreign aﬃliates the parent ﬁrm has sent at least one manager to
run the subsidiary and to transfer the organizational knowledge. This high frequency
of transplantation via CEO suggests that the two proxies for the transplantation of the
business model are complements rather than substitutes. We indeed ﬁnd that the two
measures are weakly positively correlated (see Table 3.3).
Other Organizational Information
Our sample provides additional information on the organizational structure of the
multinational corporation. We construct dummy variables to distinguish four diﬀerent
categories of the parent ﬁrms' organization: when the parent ﬁrm is a family ﬁrm
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Table 3.3: Multinationals' Transplantation of Business Model
Transplantation via CEO1 All subsidiary
= 0 = 1 ﬁrms
= 0 348 232 580
Transplantation 60.0% 40.0% 80.8%
via Organization2 = 1 73 65 138
52.9% 47.1% 19.2%
All subsidiary ﬁrms 421 297 718
58.6% 41.4% 100%
Notes: The table reports absolute number of cases and row percentages, except for the column "All subsidiary ﬁrms", where column
percentages are given. The Person's χ2 test rejects the null hypothesis that the transplantation via organization is independent of
transplantation via CEO at 15 percent signiﬁcance level (χ2(1) = 2.32, p-value = 0.13).
1 A dummy that takes a value of one if at least one manager is sent from the parent ﬁrm to the subsidiary and zero otherwise.
2 A dummy that takes a value of one if the organization is fully transplanted from the parent ﬁrm to its subsidiary and zero otherwise.
The organization is fully transplanted if each corporate decision obtained the same rank for the subsidiary ﬁrm as for the parent ﬁrm or
if only one corporate decision diﬀers.
(parent is a family ﬁrm), a domestic multinational (parent is a domestic MNE ) or a
subsidiary of a larger foreign multinational enterprise (parent is a subsidiary of foreign
MNE ) or of a domestic multinational ﬁrm (parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE ).
In addition, a dummy parent is a subsidiary captures the two latter cases together
and takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a subsidiary of either a foreign or a
domestic multinational. Some 16 percent of parent ﬁrms are family ﬁrms, 36 percent
are domestic multinationals and 48 percent are a subsidiary of a domestic or foreign
multinational (see Table 3.13 in Appendix 3.A.1 for the descriptive statistics).
The survey includes further information on the organization of subsidiary ﬁrms. The
variable horizontal investment is calculated as the share of output of the subsidiary ﬁrm
which is sold at the local market. It ranges between 0 and 100 percent with a mean of 82
percent. Two indicators of how tightly foreign aﬃliates are linked to their parent ﬁrms
are the variables parent ﬁrms' ownership share in the subsidiary and the importance
of intra-ﬁrm trade. Parent's ownership share measures the parent ﬁrms' stakes in
the foreign venture with a mean ownership share of 86 percent. Hence, Austrian and
German ﬁrms tend to have a high involvement in their subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.
The variable intra-ﬁrm trade gives the share of imports from the subsidiary ﬁrm to the
parent ﬁrm in percentage of parent ﬁrm's sales. On average, parent ﬁrms import two
percent of sales from each of their subsidiary ﬁrm in Eastern Europe either as input or
ﬁnal goods. Furthermore, the variable distance between parent and subsidiary ﬁrm is
a measure of cultural diﬀerences between the parent ﬁrms and the host regions. The
further away the foreign aﬃliate from the parent ﬁrm the more important becomes the
local knowledge and the less able are headquarters to monitor the subsidiary ﬁrm.
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Finally, we have information on how innovative the technology is that the parent
ﬁrm transfers to the subsidiary ﬁrm. The innovativeness of the technology is captured
by a dummy technology is innovative which takes a value of one if the technology is
new, a dummy technology is established with value of one if the technology is relatively
established and a dummy technology is outdated refers to a fully established or even
outdated technology. The size of the multinational corporation is measured by the
number of employees as the size of parent ﬁrm and the size of subsidiary ﬁrm. Another
measure of size is the total number of aﬃliates in Eastern Europe which is recorded
for each parent ﬁrm, though we put nine and more aﬃliates into one category to avoid
outliers.
3.2.2 Measuring Competition and Trade
We use several data sources to measure product market competition and exposure
to international trade. First we obtain from our survey data of 660 Austrian and
German multinationals with their 2200 foreign aﬃliates two subjective measures of
competition as perceived by parent and subsidiary ﬁrms. They are dummy variables
indicating for each parent or subsidiary ﬁrm whether the ﬁrm faces many domestic
competitors and many world competitors rather than few competitors, respectively.
Second, we use the AMADEUS database from Bureau van Dijk (2005) to calculate
the Lerner index of competition based on a large number of ﬁrms in the two home
countries of the headquarters of multinational ﬁrms and in all host countries of their
aﬃliates at the three-digit ISIC industry level. The Lerner index is deﬁned as (1
- average proﬁts/sales), where the average is taken, ﬁrst, across all ﬁrms available
in a three-digit industry in a speciﬁc country and, second, over the years 1996 to
2000. Finally, we use trade and tariﬀ data from the WITS UN COMTRADE and
TRAINS databases (World Bank, 2009) as well as data on domestic production from
the INDSTAT 4 (UNIDO, 2008) and STAN (OECD, 2009) databases to proxy for the
exposure to international trade of the sector of parent and subsidiary ﬁrms. From
these types of data, we calculate the import share (deﬁned as total imports divided by
domestic production), the export share (deﬁned as total exports divided by domestic
production), and the average eﬀective tariﬀ rates on imports. These variables are
calculated for each country at the three-digit industry level. If data at the three-digit
industry level are missing, the two-digit level is used.
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3.2.3 Social Capital in Host Countries
We consider additional characteristics of the subsidiaries' market environment. In
particular, the variable contract enforcement reﬂects the perception by parent ﬁrms
of ten possible risk factors that the subsidiary faces in host countries. The variable is
calculated as the mean of ranking between one and ﬁve with one as a very important
and ﬁve as an unimportant risk factor. The risk factors include the risk of proﬁt
transfer, exchange rate volatility, expropriation, changes in taxes or tariﬀs, property
rights, macro-economic instability, political turnaround, corruption, crime and maﬁa,
and banking sector collapse.
Further characteristics of the market environment of host countries are captured by
the variables trust and hierarchical religion. Trust measures the proportion of people
who answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with
people?" Hierarchical religion captures the proportion of the population belonging to
a "hierarchical religion" such as Roman and Greek Catholic, Orthodox, Gregorian and
Armenian Apostolic Church, or Islam. Both sets of data come from the World Value
Survey undertaken by the WVS Organization (2009).
3.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
We are interested in two diﬀerent, though inter-linked questions: What favors decen-
tralization of the subsidiary ﬁrm? What determines the transplantation of the business
model from the parent ﬁrm to the subsidiary ﬁrm? We start with the ﬁrst question.
3.3.1 What Favors Decentralization in Foreign Aﬃliates of
Multinationals?
The Organization of the Multinational Corporation
We ﬁrst look in Table 3.4 at the baseline model which examines how the organization of
the multinational corporation inﬂuences the level of decentralization of foreign aﬃliates
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as measured by decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrm. We start with the organization of
parent ﬁrms. As can be seen from Table 3.4, subsidiary ﬁrms are more decentralized
when their parent ﬁrms are more decentralized, when parent ﬁrms themselves are a
subsidiary of a domestic multinational (with parent is a family ﬁrm as the omitted
category) and when parent ﬁrms have more aﬃliates in other countries, though the ef-
fect is nonlinear. Subsidiary ﬁrms will, however, be more centralized when their parent
ﬁrms are larger and located in Germany and when they are themselves a subsidiary of
a foreign multinational. The signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient of decentralization of
parent of 0.42 suggests that when parent ﬁrms become more decentralized by one rank
(a 25 percent increase in the possible range of the level of decentralization) the level of
decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrms increases by 10.5 percent. We obtain this number
by multiplying 1 (an increase of one rank) with the coeﬃcient of 0.42 resulting in an
increase of the level of decentralization in the subsidiary of 0.42, which is 10.5 percent
of the possible range of levels of decentralization of subsidiaries. Hence, the level of
decentralization of parent ﬁrms is an economically important variable determining how
decentralized the subsidiary is.
The organization of subsidiary ﬁrms also matters for the level of decentralization.
Subsidiaries tend to be more decentralized when they are a horizontal foreign invest-
ment in which they sell mostly at the local market, when they are larger and further
away from headquarters. Subsidiaries are, however, more centralized when they are
more tightly linked to their parent ﬁrms. This is the case when headquarters has a
larger ownership stake in subsidiaries and when the subsidiary is part of a global supply
chain (measured by the volume of intra-ﬁrm trade) when it primarily provides inputs
and ﬁnal goods to headquarters.
All estimated coeﬃcients are mostly signiﬁcant at conventional levels and robust
to the inclusion of host country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The inclusion of industry
ﬁxed eﬀects substantially contributes to the explanatory power of the regression in
columns (3) and (4) as the R2 increases from 0.28 to 0.46. The inclusion of host
country ﬁxed eﬀects appears less important (column (2)). We include both types of
ﬁxed eﬀects in the following analysis. The organizational variables together account
for about 50 percent of the variation in the level of decentralization of foreign aﬃliates
(column (9)) which leaves room for other variables to play a role.
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Market Competition and International Trade
Next, we turn to the inﬂuence of the market environment in host countries on the
ability of foreign aﬃliates to decentralize. We start with the role of competition and
international trade in Table 3.5. In their theory of decentralization Marin and Verdier
(2004, 2007, 2008b) suggest that the level of competition and international trade needs
to reach a critical level before ﬁrms start to decentralize. Firms trade oﬀ the proﬁt gain
from having control against the proﬁt loss from losing the initiative of middle managers.
When competition becomes suﬃciently strong the latter eﬀect on proﬁts dominates and
ﬁrms decentralize to empower middle managers. In contrast to the previous empirical
literature on the decentralization of national ﬁrms (Marin and Verdier, 2007; Marin,
2008; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2008; Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen, 2009) we ﬁnd that
foreign aﬃliates of multinational corporations tend to centralize in response to more
competition in host countries. Column (1) shows that the level of decentralization of
subsidiaries declines with many domestic competitors rather than few competitors (the
omitted category). When subsidiaries face many domestic competitors rather than few
competitors they reduce the level of decentralization by a rank of 0.11 which is 2.75
percent.
One problem with the subjective ﬁrm level measure of competition is that it may
suﬀer from reverse causality. More decentralized ﬁrms may face less tough competi-
tion (because they may empower their knowledge workers to bring new ideas to the
ﬁrm resulting in higher quality of products) rather than that ﬁrms facing less tough
competition decentralize more, as we postulate here. To prevent the possibility of a
single ﬁrm inﬂuencing the market outcome we introduce a more exogenous measure
of competition at the sectoral level for the host country markets given by the Lerner
index. Column (2) reports the results and shows that the previous result in column
(1) is robust to the measure of competition as subsidiaries tend to centralize with an
increase in the Lerner index. An increase in the Lerner index in the aﬃliates' markets
by ten percent reduces the level of decentralization in aﬃliates by a rank of 0.14 which
is 3.5 percent.
A possible explanation for the contrasting results with the empirical literature on
national ﬁrms is that subsidiaries in host countries of Eastern Europe (including the
former Soviet Union) may face less competition compared with ﬁrms in developed
market economies and hence they do not reach the threshold level of competition
suggested by Marin and Verdier (2007) and they stay centralized. A comparison of
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Table 3.5: Level of Decentralization in Subsidiary Firms
The Role of Competition and Trade: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable Decentralization of Subsidiary Firm1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm1 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is located in Germany -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.34***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is a subsidiary of foreign MNE2 -0.20*** -0.10 -0.18*** 0.011 0.0100 -0.14
(0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.94) (0.94) (0.32)
Parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE2 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.16
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11)
Parent is a domestic MNE2 -0.065 0.010 -0.053 0.044 0.044 -0.12
(0.26) (0.86) (0.36) (0.70) (0.71) (0.28)
Log (Size of parent ﬁrm) -0.023* -0.027* -0.029** 0.0070 0.0065 0.0014
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.84) (0.85) (0.97)
Log (Size of subsidiary ﬁrm) 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.068** 0.069** 0.087***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
Number of aﬃliates 0.098** 0.11** 0.081* 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.23***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Number of aﬃliates)2 -0.0091** -0.011*** -0.0076* -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.023***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent's ownership share -0.21** -0.16* -0.21** -0.24* -0.24* -0.29**
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
Log (Distance) 0.043 0.076* 0.055 0.15** 0.15** 0.11
(0.26) (0.06) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13)
Horizontal investment 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.44) (0.43) (0.45)
Many domestic competitors3 -0.11**
(0.01)
Subsidiary market Lerner -0.014**
(0.03)
Many world competitors3 0.089*
(0.09)
Import share -0.028*
(0.09)
Export share -0.032**
(0.02)
Tariﬀs -0.00098
(0.46)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies (3d) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1090 960 1083 373 375 372
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.52
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%
Notes: Coeﬃcients obtained by OLS with robust standard errors. P-values reported in parentheses. See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1
for the deﬁnition of variables.
1 Mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters
of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the subsidiary manager for decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm or the divisional manager for decentralization of parent ﬁrm (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
2 Parent is a family ﬁrm is the omitted category of parent ﬁrm's organization.
3 Many domestic competitors and many world competitors refer to the subsidiary ﬁrm's market.
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the Lerner index and the ﬁrm level measure of domestic competition in Austria and
Germany with those in host countries (see Tables 3.13, 3.16 and 3.17 in Appendix 3.A.3)
reveals, however, that competition does not seem to be weaker in host countries. It
appears then that the results are driven by the fact that the ﬁrms in our data sample are
multinational rather than national ﬁrms. Austrian and German multinationals relocate
activities to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in order to exploit the lower
labor costs there. When competition intensiﬁes in host countries the level of costs
matters more for proﬁts and hence multinationals centralize foreign aﬃliates to avoid
the possibility that subsidiary managers choose activities which are more favorable to
them than to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The proﬁt gain from having control dominates
the proﬁt loss from losing the initiative of subsidiary managers when multinationals
relocate activities to low-cost host countries to save labor costs.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that subsidiaries centralize their organization in response to
a greater exposure to international trade as measured by the import and export ratios
at the sectoral level given in columns (4) and (5). The eﬀect of a change in the trade
ratios on the level of command in aﬃliates is, however, almost negligible. An increase
in the trade ratios in host countries by ten percentage points reduces the level of
decentralization in foreign aﬃliates by a rank of approximately 0.003 which is 0.08
percent. The negligible eﬀect of the trade ratios on the level of decentralization of
aﬃliates is, however, not surprising. The average trade ratio of a sector hides the true
exposure to trade of individual ﬁrms. As suggested by recent literature on trade and
ﬁrm heterogeneity (see Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007) the
distribution of individual ﬁrms' trade exposure in a sector is particularly skewed. Only
a small proportion of ﬁrms in a sector engage in trade activities (the extensive margin
of trade) and produce a signiﬁcant share of their output for the world market (the
intensive margin of trade). Therefore, an increase in the trade ratio of the sector does
not expose the mass of subsidiary ﬁrms in the sector to the critical level of international
competition as is suggested by Marin and Verdier (2007) and thus aﬃliate ﬁrms do not
signiﬁcantly change the level of decentralization.
We introduce the ﬁrm level measure of trade many world competitors which is sup-
posed to be better able to capture ﬁrms' true exposure to trade. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that many world competitors is positively associated with the level of decentralization
of aﬃliates (column (3)). When subsidiaries are faced with many foreign competitors
rather than a few, they increase the level of decentralization by a rank of 0.09 which
is 2.25 percent. We interpret the contrasting results of the two measures of trade as
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suggesting that aﬃliates with a large number of foreign competitors reach the critical
level of international competition and thus decentralize, whereas an increase in the
trade ratio of the sector does not expose a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms in the sector to
this critical level of trade and thus they remain centralized.4
Note that the estimated coeﬃcients of the organizational variables do not change
with the inclusion of the diﬀerent measures of competition. The size of the estimated
coeﬃcients does, however, change with the inclusion of the trade ratios. This is, nev-
ertheless, a result of a substantial drop in the sample size owing to the unavailability
of data on trade shares for some of the Eastern European countries.
Surprisingly, the eﬀective tariﬀ rates on imports have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
level of decentralization of foreign aﬃliates. A closer inspection of the data reveals,
however, that Eastern European countries tend to have higher tariﬀs on imports in
less productive sectors with lower proﬁts. Hence, import tariﬀs and proﬁts tend to be
negatively (rather than positively) correlated.
Endogeneity
We proceed next to address the problem of endogeneity associated with using the level
of decentralization of parent ﬁrms as a determinant of the level of decentralization of
foreign aﬃliates. It could be argued that the level of decentralization of subsidiary
ﬁrms may inﬂuence the level of command in parent ﬁrms rather than the other way
around. Parent ﬁrms' involvement in foreign aﬃliates may crowd out the CEO's ability
to monitor and control at headquarters. This trade-oﬀ between monitoring at home and
abroad may then force parent ﬁrms to decentralize. In this case we would underestimate
the true eﬀect of the parents' level of decentralization on subsidiary ﬁrms. We address
the potential endogeneity problem in Table 3.6.
We introduce the toughness of competition at the headquarters' ﬁrms' markets
as an instrument for the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms. The relevance of
this instrument is motivated by the theory of decentralization of ﬁrms suggested by
4When we aggregate the ﬁrm level measure of trade many world competitors over all host countries
and compare it with the ﬁrm level measure of trade for the two home countries Austria and Germany,
we indeed ﬁnd that host countries are on average much less exposed to international competition.
About 30 percent of subsidiaries in host countries face many world competitors compared with 73
percent of parent ﬁrms in Austria and Germany. See Table 3.13 in Appendix 3.A.1.
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Table 3.6: Level of Decentralization in Subsidiary Firms
The Role of Competition and Trade: IV Estimates
Dependent Variable Decentralization of Subsidiary Firm1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm1 0.67*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.36 0.38 0.28
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.43) (0.29)
Parent is located in Germany -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.47*** -0.46*** -0.35***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is a subsidiary of foreign MNE2 -0.18*** -0.098 -0.17*** 0.00085 -0.014 -0.088
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (1.00) (0.97) (0.71)
Parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE2 0.048 0.11 0.089 0.31 0.30 0.19
(0.55) (0.16) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.18)
Parent is a domestic MNE2 -0.15 -0.067 -0.13 0.035 0.021 -0.077
(0.12) (0.45) (0.18) (0.92) (0.95) (0.68)
Log (Size of parent ﬁrm) -0.052*** -0.047** -0.054*** 0.0056 0.0031 0.0097
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.92) (0.96) (0.79)
Log (Size of subsidiary ﬁrm) 0.045** 0.047** 0.047** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.088***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of aﬃliates 0.052 0.078* 0.040 0.29** 0.29* 0.26**
(0.27) (0.08) (0.39) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01)
(Number of aﬃliates)2 -0.0056 -0.0079** -0.0046 -0.028** -0.028** -0.026***
(0.18) (0.05) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Parent's ownership share -0.14 -0.14 -0.15* -0.24* -0.24* -0.30**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02)
Log (Distance) 0.047 0.087** 0.057 0.16* 0.16* 0.098
(0.19) (0.01) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Horizontal investment 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25)
Many domestic competitors3 -0.11**
(0.01)
Subsidiary market Lerner -0.013**
(0.04)
Many world competitors3 0.14***
(0.01)
Import share -0.029
(0.32)
Export share -0.033
(0.27)
Tariﬀs -0.00099
(0.61)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies (3d) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1039 955 1032 373 375 371
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.54 0.55 0.52
First Stage:
Parent market Lerner4 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.027 0.026 0.043**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.22) (0.03)
F-statistics5 19.29 16.55 21.25 1.59 1.53 4.96
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%
Notes: Coeﬃcients obtained by instrumental variable technique. P-values reported in parentheses. The instrument for the decentralization
of parent ﬁrm is the variable Parent market Lerner. See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for the deﬁnition of variables.
1 Mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters
of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the subsidiary manager for decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm or the divisional manager for decentralization of parent ﬁrm (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
2 Parent is a family ﬁrm is the omitted category of parent ﬁrm's organization.
3 Many domestic competitors and many world competitors refer to the subsidiary ﬁrm's market.
4 Estimated coeﬃcients of the instrument parent market Lerner in the ﬁrst stage regression.
5 F-statistics for the signiﬁcance of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage regression.
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Marin and Verdier (2007). They argue that the level of decentralization of ﬁrms will
be governed by the toughness of competition in the market and they indeed ﬁnd that
the intensity of competition has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of decen-
tralization of Austrian and German ﬁrms. We measure the instrument toughness of
competition in headquarters' ﬁrms' markets by the Lerner index and denote it as parent
market Lerner. The instrument can be considered as exogenous to the decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrms as it reﬂects the competitive conditions in parent ﬁrms' markets
rather than in subsidiaries' ﬁrms' markets and the Lerner index for the headquarters'
ﬁrms' markets is based on a large sample of ﬁrms at the three-digit ISIC level from the
AMADEUS data. Therefore, we can safely exclude feedback eﬀects from the level of
decentralization of subsidiaries on the intensity of competition in parent ﬁrms' markets.
In Table 3.6 we indeed ﬁnd that the level of competition in parent ﬁrms' markets
is a relevant instrument as more competition is estimated to signiﬁcantly increase the
level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage regressions (columns (1) to
(3)). Moreover, the estimated eﬀect of the parent ﬁrms' decentralization on the level of
command in subsidiaries indeed turns out to be underestimated in the OLS regressions
as the estimated coeﬃcients increase now to over 0.6 compared with 0.4 before. In
the IV regressions in columns (1) to (3) some of the other organizational variables
now become insigniﬁcant or weakly signiﬁcant, whereas the ﬁrm level measure of trade
many world competitors now has a much stronger eﬀect on the level of decentralization
of subsidiaries. Turning to the results with the sectoral measures of trade in columns
(4) to (6), we ﬁnd that the Lerner index of headquarters' ﬁrms' markets is only a
weak instrument and the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms as well as the trade
ratios becomes insigniﬁcant. We do not, however, have the same conﬁdence in these
regressions since the sample size drops to one-third and the sectoral trade ratios are less
able to capture ﬁrms' true exposure to trade. Still, the sign of the estimated coeﬃcients
remains the same as in the OLS regressions and thus the direction of the estimated
eﬀects appears robust to the use of the alternative estimation technique.
Social Capital: Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Religion
Finally, we turn to other characteristics of the market environment which may have
helped foreign aﬃliates to decentralize. Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2009) have
found that social capital as proxied by trust and the rule of law are positively associated
with the level of decentralization in 4000 ﬁrms in the US, Europe, and Asia. We expect
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these variables to play an even more important role in our data sample as our aﬃliates
are often located in countries with very weak legal institutions and low protection
of property rights. When contracts are not respected, trust and religion may become
critical mechanisms for obtaining cooperation between parent ﬁrms and their subsidiary
managers. Figure 3.4 indeed shows for three groups of host countries that contracts
and trust appear to be substitutes as they are weakly negatively correlated.5 Therefore,
we include these measures of social capital in Table 3.7. We exclude the country ﬁxed
eﬀects in the regressions when trust and hierarchical religion are included, since both
are country-speciﬁc variables.
Figure 3.4: Social Capital in Host Regions
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Notes: CEE refers to Central Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland), Baltics to Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), SEE to South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia), and Former Soviet Union includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. The level of contract enforcement is used as a mean of ranking between
one (important) and ﬁve (not important) factors aﬀecting contract enforcement divided by ﬁve to obtain a measure in the range zero and
one (for a listing of the factors see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1). The level of hierarchical religion is the proportion of people that list a
hierarchical religion (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, Islam, Gregorian or Armenian Apostolic Church) to the question: "Do
you belong to a religious denomination? If yes: Which one?" The level of trust is the proportion of people that answer "Most people
can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in
dealing with people?"
We ﬁnd that multinationals tend to give subsidiary managers more autonomy when
they perceive that contracts are well enforced in host countries. An improvement in
contract enforcement by one rank in host countries (a 25 percent increase in the possible
5See also Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 in Appendix 3.A.3 for the level of contract enforcement, trust,
and hierarchical religion in host countries, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Level of Decentralization in Subsidiary Firms
The Role of Contracts, Trust, and Religion
Dependent Variable Decentralization of Subsidiary Firm1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm1 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.57*** 0.56***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is located in Germany -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.27***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is a subsidiary of foreign MNE2 -0.058 -0.041 -0.042 -0.054 -0.064 -0.060
(0.41) (0.55) (0.54) (0.44) (0.31) (0.34)
Parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE2 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.15* 0.16**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04)
Parent is a domestic MNE2 0.058 0.072 0.067 0.064 -0.028 -0.015
(0.36) (0.25) (0.29) (0.31) (0.76) (0.87)
Log (Size of parent ﬁrm) -0.029** -0.027* -0.028** -0.028* -0.045** -0.042**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (Size of subsidiary ﬁrm) 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.051***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of aﬃliates 0.12** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12** 0.091** 0.092**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
(Number of aﬃliates)2 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.0092** -0.0092**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Parent's ownership share -0.21** -0.22** -0.21** -0.21** -0.18** -0.19**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Log (Distance) 0.069* 0.062** 0.050** 0.064** 0.082** 0.073***
(0.09) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Horizontal investment 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.24** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Subsidiary market Lerner -0.014** -0.015*** -0.011** -0.016*** -0.014** -0.015***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Contract enforcement 0.10*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trust 0.55 1.56** 1.52**
(0.28) (0.01) (0.02)
Hierarchical religion 0.089 0.27** 0.26**
(0.30) (0.01) (0.02)
Country dummies YES NO NO NO YES NO
Industry dummies (3d) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 946 946 946 946 941 941
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.46
First Stage:
Parent market Lerner3 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.00) (0.00)
F-statistics4 26.69 27.52
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%
Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in columns (1) to (4) and IV estimates in columns (5) and (6). P-values reported in
parentheses. The instrument for the decentralization of parent ﬁrm is the variable parent market Lerner. See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1
for the deﬁnition of variables.
1 Mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters
of the parent ﬁrm (centralized) or the CEO (decentralized) takes the decision. The CEO is the subsidiary manager for decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm or the divisional manager for decentralization of parent ﬁrm (see Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for more details).
For a listing of corporate decisions see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.A.2.
2 Parent is a family ﬁrm is the omitted category of parent ﬁrm's organization.
3 Estimated coeﬃcients of the instrument parent market Lerner in the ﬁrst stage regression.
4 F-statistics for the signiﬁcance of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage regression.
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range between one and ﬁve) induces aﬃliates to decentralize by a rank of 0.13 which
is 3.25 percent. In other words, multinational parent ﬁrms in Austria and Germany
appear not to delegate responsibility in decision-making to their subsidiary managers
in host countries with weak legal institutions, because they may fear that subsidiary
managers will exploit the opportunity and misuse the ﬁrms' assets under their control
when the likelihood of punishment by the legal system is low. Similarly, we ﬁnd that
trust facilitates decentralization. A ten percentage point increase in the share of people
who trust others leads to an increase in the level of decentralization of 0.16 ranks
which is four percent. The estimated coeﬃcient of hierarchical religion contradicts the
ﬁndings of Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2009). We ﬁnd that a larger proportion of
the population in a country belonging to a hierarchical religion (believing in authority)
favors decentralization rather than centralization. One possible explanation is that non-
hierarchical religions such as the Protestant Christian church are not very prevalent
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the variable hierarchical
religion may capture the total proportion of religious people in a country. In our sample,
the correlation between these two variables is indeed 0.93. Note, however, that when
the two variables are included separately in the estimation they cease to be signiﬁcant.
Lastly, we show in columns (5) and (6) that the estimated coeﬃcients of the vari-
ables on social capital are robust, when we instrument for parent ﬁrms' decentralization.
3.3.2 When Does Transplantation Happen?
The previous section has shown that multinationals are often able to imprint the level
of decentralization on their foreign aﬃliates. At the same time, however, Table 3.1
shows that only 24 percent of foreign aﬃliates use the same organization as their
parent ﬁrms. Why do multinationals transplant so infrequently? What determines
whether or not multinationals transplant their business model across countries? Does
this depend on "home-made", "host-made" or "organization-made" factors? In other
words, are German ﬁrms by being located in a larger more competitive domestic market
than Austrian ﬁrms better able to export their business culture abroad? Or is it the
other way around and the likelihood to transplant does not depend on the natural
advantage of the home market of multinationals but rather on how favorable host
countries' markets are toward foreign aﬃliates with a diﬀerent business model from that
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of domestic ﬁrms?6 Or is the ability or willingness to transplant driven by the global
business organization of the multinational corporation rather than the characteristics
of home and host countries' markets? We examine these questions in Tables 3.8 to
3.11.
Transplantation via Organization
In Table 3.8 we estimate the probability of transplantation in a Probit model in which
the dependent variable is a dummy variable transplantation via organization. The
dummy takes a value of one if each corporate decision has the same hierarchical rank
in foreign aﬃliates as in parent ﬁrms or if one corporate decision diﬀers in rank. In this
case the organization is fully transplanted, otherwise (when more than one corporate
decision diﬀers in hierarchical rank) we consider the organization as not transplanted.7
In column (1) we estimate the baseline model including all variables determining the
global business organization of the multinational corporation such as the level of decen-
tralization of parent and subsidiary ﬁrms, parent is subsidiary, number of aﬃliates, size
of subsidiary, parent ﬁrms' ownership share in the foreign aﬃliate and distance. We
ﬁnd that multinationals are more likely to transplant their business model to foreign
aﬃliates in host countries when parent ﬁrms are more decentralized, the aﬃliates are
larger and when multinationals have a larger number of aﬃliates (although the eﬀect
is nonlinear). Multinationals are, however, less likely to transplant when the aﬃliates
are more decentralized and further away, when the parent ﬁrm is itself a subsidiary
and when it has a larger stake in the subsidiary. The level of decentralization of the
parent ﬁrm has an economically important eﬀect on the likelihood to transplant. When
the level of decentralization increases by one rank (the parent ﬁrm becomes more de-
centralized by 25 percent) then the probability to transplant the business model to
the foreign aﬃliate increases by about 16 percentage points (for the partial eﬀects of
Table 3.8 see Table 3.9).
One variable stands out by virtue of its importance in the likelihood to transplant
via organization, namely, the level of innovation of the technology transferred to foreign
6Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2009) indeed ﬁnd that multinationals tend to operate with a
diﬀerent business model by being more decentralized than national ﬁrms.
7As a robustness check we also use softer versions of full transplantation of organization with very
similar results.
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Table 3.8: Transplantation via Organization
The Role of Competition, Contracts, and Religion
Dependent Variable Transplantation via Organization1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.79*** 0.69*** 0.79*** 0.73***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrm -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.58***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Parent is located in Germany 0.51*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.32* 0.66*** 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.26)
Parent is a subsidiary -0.24** -0.27** -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.33**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log (Size of subsidiary) 0.070* 0.085** 0.10** 0.10** 0.095** 0.077*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Number of aﬃliates 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.68*** 0.58***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Number of aﬃliates)2 -0.044*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.047***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (Distance) -0.23*** -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.40*** -0.21**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Parent's ownership share -0.82*** -1.02*** -0.85*** -0.81*** -0.65** -0.76***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Technology is established2 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.56*** 0.37** 0.46*** 0.38**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Technology is innovative2 1.24*** 1.22*** 1.29*** 1.27*** 1.25*** 1.32***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Many domestic competitors-subsidiary 0.72***
(0.00)
Many domestic competitors-parent -0.17
(0.30)
Subsidiary market Lerner 0.045* 0.039*
(0.09) (0.06)
Parent market Lerner 0.084*** 0.086***
(0.00) (0.00)
Many world competitors-subsidiary 0.43***
(0.01)
Many world competitors-parent -0.43***
(0.00)
Contract enforcement 0.059
(0.60)
Trust -0.87
(0.71)
Hierarchical religion -0.46
(0.25)
Country dummies NO YES YES YES YES NO
Industry dummies (2d) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 933 920 887 794 865 785
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35
* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%
Notes: Probit estimates with robust standard errors. P-values reported in parentheses. See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for the deﬁnition
of variables.
1 A dummy that takes a value of one if the organization is fully transplanted and zero otherwise. The organization is fully transplanted if
each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent ﬁrm as for the subsidiary ﬁrm or if only one corporate decision
diﬀers.
2 Technology is outdated is the omitted category of technology.
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Table 3.9: Transplantation via Organization
The Role of Competition, Contracts, and Religion: Partial Eﬀects1
Dependent Variable Transplantation via Organization2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm 16.5 16.1 14.6 14.4 15.4 15.0
Decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrm -13.7 -13.9 -11.6 -12.1 -11.2 -12.3
Parent is located in Germany 13.7 14.9 10.9 7.3 15.7 6.8
Parent is a subsidiary -5.2 -5.8 -7.0 -8.1 -7.9 -7.6
Log (Size of subsidiary) 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.0
Number of aﬃliates 12.3 13.0 11.6 11.8 13.2 12.6
Number of aﬃliates2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0
Log (Distance) -5.0 -7.7 -6.6 -6.9 -7.7 -6.4
Parent's ownership share -18.1 -22.1 -15.7 -16.8 -12.6 -16.3
Technology is established3 8.5 9.6 9.7 7.3 8.4 7.9
Technology is innovative3 40.1 39.0 38.5 40.0 38.2 40.1
Many domestic competitors-subsidiary 13.6
Many domestic competitors-parent -3.1
Subsidiary market Lerner 0.9 1.0
Parent market Lerner 1.8 1.8
Many world competitors-subsidiary 9.4
Many world competitors-parent -9.3
Contract enforcement 0.8
Trust 0.0
Hierarchical religion 0.0
Country dummies NO YES YES YES YES NO
Industry dummies (2d) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 933 920 887 794 865 785
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35
1 Marginal eﬀects at mean in percentage points for continuous variables and discrete changes from zero to one in percentage points for
dummy variables based on Probit estimates with robust standard errors in Table 3.8. See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.A.1 for the deﬁnition
of variables.
2 A dummy that takes a value of one if the organization is fully transplanted and zero otherwise. The organization is fully transplanted if
each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent ﬁrm as for the subsidiary ﬁrm or if only one corporate decision
diﬀers.
3 Technology is outdated is the omitted category of technology.
aﬃliates. When the parent ﬁrm transfers an innovative technology rather than a fully
established or even outdated technology (the omitted category) then the probability
to transplant the organization to subsidiary ﬁrms is increased by 40 percentage points.
It appears that technology transfer and organizational transfer are complements and
go together.8
8This corresponds to evidence in Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007);
Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2007). Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen ﬁnd that US ﬁrms do IT
better than European ﬁrms because they are more decentralized, giving more ﬂexibility and power to
those workers that are implementing the technology.
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Taken together the "organization-made" factors appear to be most important for
the probability determining whether or not multinationals transplant their business
model to foreign aﬃliates.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the home country dummy parent is located
in Germany rather than Austria does support the notion that "home-made" factors are
also important for the likelihood to transplant. Multinational ﬁrms located in Germany
rather than Austria are by some 15 percentage points more likely to transplant. This
eﬀect acts beyond and above the fact that German parent ﬁrms tend to be more
decentralized than Austrian parent ﬁrms (which is already captured by the positive
coeﬃcient of decentralization of parent in the regression). Another important "home-
made" factor is the level of competition and the exposure to trade in the home markets
where headquarters' ﬁrms are located. It appears that more domestic competition in
the parent ﬁrms' market increases the likelihood that transplantation takes place (as
is suggested by parent market Lerner, but the ﬁrm level measure of competition many
domestic competitors in the parent market is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels). An
increase of parent market Lerner by ten percentage points increases the probability to
transplant by eighteen percentage points. This eﬀect of competition on the probability
to transplant is beyond and above the eﬀect of decentralization of parent ﬁrms on
the probability to transplant. This result indeed suggests that Germany is the more
favorable home market for transplantation.9 Furthermore, we ﬁnd that when parent
ﬁrms face many world competitors rather than a few they are less likely to transplant
by nine percentage points.
We turn now to the inﬂuence of "host-made" factors on the probability to trans-
plant the organization to subsidiary ﬁrms in host countries. In column (2) of Table 3.8
we include the host country dummies in the regression which increase the pseudo R2
from 0.29 to 0.32, suggesting that "host-made" factors do play a role in explaining
the probability to transplant. As in home countries, we expect the level of competi-
tion and trade in host countries to be important for the ability of multinationals to
transplant. We indeed ﬁnd this. The Lerner index and the ﬁrm level measure of do-
mestic competition as well as world competition for the subsidiaries markets all indicate
that transplantation is more likely when competition is tougher and trade exposure is
stronger in host countries. An increase in the subsidiary market Lerner by ten per-
centage points increases the likelihood to transplant by nine percentage points and the
9Marin and Verdier (2007) show that more intense competition in the parents' markets has led
parent ﬁrms to decentralize their organization. This ﬁnding is also in line with our ﬁrst stage regression
results in Table 3.6.
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probability to transplant is fourteen and nine percentage points, respectively, larger
when the subsidiary ﬁrm faces many rather than few domestic and foreign competitors
(see columns (3) to (5) of Table 3.9).
Interestingly, contracts, trust, and hierarchical religion appear not to aﬀect the
probability to transplant via organization (column (6)).
Transplantation via CEO
Alternatively to transplanting via organization, the multinational ﬁrm may aﬀect the
business culture of the subsidiary ﬁrm by sending one or more managers from the
parent ﬁrm to the host country to run the foreign aﬃliate. This seems to be a common
practice, since more than 40 percent of foreign aﬃliates are run by CEOs of parent
ﬁrms (see Table 3.1). We examine the probability of sending at least one manager to
the foreign aﬃliate in Tables 3.10 and 3.11.
We run Probit regressions with the dependent variable transplantation via CEO
which takes a value of one if at least one manager is sent from the parent ﬁrm to its
subsidiary ﬁrm. Parent ﬁrms are more likely to send their own managers to run the
aﬃliate ﬁrm when the parent and subsidiary ﬁrm is larger, when the parent ﬁrm is
located in Austria rather than Germany, when the subsidiary ﬁrm is centralized and
has little autonomy, when the multinational ﬁrm does not have too many aﬃliates and
when the technology transferred to the foreign aﬃliate is innovative. Among these
determinants, being an Austrian multinational which transfers a new technology to
a foreign aﬃliate with little autonomy from the parent ﬁrm maximizes the chances
that the multinational ﬁrm will send one or more CEOs to its foreign aﬃliate (see Ta-
ble 3.11). As sending a manager is more likely when the subsidiary has little autonomy
from the parent ﬁrm, the two ways of transplanting appear to be complements which
reinforce each other in helping the parent ﬁrm to exert control over its subsidiary ﬁrm.
In addition, it appears that Austrian multinationals are less likely to transplant via
organization but rather imprint their business culture on their subsidiaries by sending
CEOs.
We now turn to the inﬂuence of the market environment on the probability of
sending a CEO to the subsidiary given in columns (2) to (4) of Tables 3.10 and 3.11.
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We start with the host countries' markets. More domestic competition in the sub-
sidiary ﬁrms' markets (given by the subsidiary market Lerner and by the ﬁrm level
measure many domestic competitors) as well as a stronger exposure to trade (mea-
sured by many world competitors) makes it less likely that the parent ﬁrms will send
their own managers to run the subsidiary. A possible explanation is that when the
subsidiary is faced with tough domestic and foreign competition, the local knowledge
of the market becomes more important and hence local rather than foreign CEOs tend
to be employed to run the subsidiary. Turning to the parent ﬁrms' markets, we ﬁnd
that more domestic competition favors engaging the parent ﬁrm's CEO in the foreign
aﬃliate (at least according to the ﬁrm level measure of domestic competition), whereas
a greater exposure to trade of the parent ﬁrm tends to make it less likely that the
multinational will send its manager to the aﬃliate. A possible explanation for the
latter result is given by the model of Marin and Verdier (2004) and the evidence in
Marin (2009). With a greater exposure to trade in the parent ﬁrms' market a "war
for manager talent" may be leading foreign ﬁrms to compete with incumbent ﬁrms
for manager talent, making the available managers in the parent ﬁrms' market more
scarce. This trade-induced scarcity of managers in the parent ﬁrms' market makes it
less likely that parent ﬁrms will send additional managers to their aﬃliates in host
countries. The parent and subsidiary ﬁrm's market conditions are economically im-
portant for the probability of sending a CEO. Many world competitors at the parent
market or many domestic competitors at the subsidiary market rather than few make
it less likely by 15 to 23 percentage points that a manager is sent to the aﬃliate.
Interestingly, although the social capital variables do not change the probability
to transplant the organization to the aﬃliate, they do aﬀect the probability to send
a manager to the aﬃliate. In host countries with working legal institutions and good
contract enforcement it is less likely (and probably less important) that the multina-
tional ﬁrm will send its own manager to control the subsidiary. A larger proportion
of the population in the host countries belonging to hierarchical religion and thus be-
lieving in authority makes it also less likely that a parent ﬁrm's manager is employed
in the subsidiary. One possible reason is that the belief in authority does not extend
to foreign managers. Another possible explanation is that in countries with a larger
proportion of religious people in the population it is less likely that workers shirk their
duty and hence it is less important to exert control.
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigate with unique data on 660 headquarters' ﬁrms in Austria
and Germany with their 2200 foreign aﬃliates in Eastern Europe including the former
Soviet Union countries the conditions under which foreign aﬃliates decentralize their
decision-making and implement the business model of their multinational parent ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that one variable stands out in terms of importance for the level of decen-
tralization of subsidiary ﬁrms, namely the level of decentralization of parent ﬁrms. We
also identify other organizational variables as central in the decision to decentralize the
subsidiary such as the size of the multinational corporation and whether the foreign
aﬃliate is a horizontal rather than a vertical foreign direct investment. In addition,
the competitive and trading environments in host countries play a role in the level of
decentralization of subsidiaries. Interestingly, we ﬁnd in contrast to the available em-
pirical literature on national ﬁrms that multinational ﬁrms centralize their subsidiaries
with more competition than national ﬁrms. The trade exposure, in turn, turns out to
favor decentralization of the subsidiary. The eﬀect of competition on the level of decen-
tralization of the subsidiaries is robust to diﬀerent measures of competition. Moreover,
the results remain unchanged when we deal with the possible problem of endogeneity
of the parent's ﬁrm organization. We use the parent ﬁrms' level of competition in their
home market as an instrument for their organization. Finally, we somewhat conﬁrm
the results of the importance of social capital for the level of decentralization found in
a previous paper on national ﬁrms, namely, that trust and contract enforcement tend
to facilitate decentralization.
In contrast to the decision to decentralize, the decision to transplant the business
model to the foreign aﬃliate is more strongly aﬀected by the market conditions in both
the home and host country, whereas trust, contracts and religion in host countries
appear to be less decisive. We examine two ways of transplanting the multinational
business model to the foreign aﬃliate, one via transplanting the organization and one
via transplanting the CEO. We ﬁnd that tougher domestic and foreign competition
in the subsidiary markets favors transplantation via organization but hinders trans-
plantation via manager. Tougher domestic competition in the parent market, however,
favors both types of transplantation whereas foreign competition in parent markets
decreases the likelihood that multinationals transplant via organization as well as via
CEO. Transplantation of organization and of CEO appear to be weak complements
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although German multinationals tend to go for transplanting via the organization and
Austrian multinationals for transplanting via the CEO.
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3.A Appendices to Chapter 3
3.A.1 Data and Descriptives
Table 3.12: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description
1. Organization of the Multinational Corporation
Organization of the Parent Firm
Decentralization
of parent ﬁrm
mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several
corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters (centralized) or the
divisional manager of the parent ﬁrm (decentralized) takes the decision; see Ta-
ble 3.14 for a listing of corporate decisions
Parent is located
in Germany
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is located in Germany and
zero otherwise
Parent ﬁrm's organization categorical variable with four categories: parent is a family ﬁrm, parent is a
subsidiary of a foreign MNE, parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE and parent
is a domestic MNE; a more detailed description of the categories follows
↪→ Parent is a family ﬁrm dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a family ﬁrm (i.e. indepen-
dent ﬁrm with subsidiaries only in Eastern Europe) and zero otherwise
↪→ Parent is a subsidiary
of foreign MNE
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a subsidiary of foreign
multinational and zero otherwise
↪→ Parent is a subsidiary
of domestic MNE
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a subsidiary of domestic
(Austrian/German) multinational and zero otherwise
↪→ Parent is
a domestic MNE
dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a domestic (Austrian/
German) multinational and zero otherwise
Parent is a subsidiary dummy that takes a value of one if the parent ﬁrm is a subsidiary of a larger
(foreign or domestic) multinational and zero otherwise
Organization of the Subsidiary Firm
Decentralization
of subsidiary ﬁrm
mean of ranking between one (centralized) and ﬁve (decentralized) of several
corporate decisions depending on whether the headquarters of the parent ﬁrm
(centralized) or the subsidiary manager (decentralized) takes the decision; see
Table 3.14 for a listing of corporate decisions
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Description
Transplantation
via organization
dummy that takes a value of one if the organization is fully transplanted from the
parent ﬁrm to its subsidiary and zero otherwise; full transplantation means that
either each corporate decision obtained the same hierarchical rank for the parent
ﬁrm as for the subsidiary ﬁrm or only one corporate decision diﬀers
Transplantation via CEO dummy that takes a value of one if at least one manager is sent from the parent
ﬁrm to the subsidiary and zero otherwise
Intra-ﬁrm trade share of intra-ﬁrm imports from the subsidiary ﬁrm to the parent ﬁrm in parent
sales
Parent's ownership share parent ﬁrm's ownership share in the subsidiary ﬁrm
Distance distance between the parent and the subsidiary ﬁrm in km
Horizontal investment share of output sold by the subsidiary ﬁrm at its domestic market
Technology categorical variable with three categories: technology is outdated, established,
and new; a more detailed description of the categories follows
↪→ Technology is outdated dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
fully established or outdated and zero otherwise
↪→ Technology is established dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
relatively established and zero otherwise
↪→ Technology is innovative dummy that takes a value of one if the technology of the investment project is
new and zero otherwise
Country dummies country dummies for the location of subsidiary ﬁrm
Industry dummies (3d) three-digit industry dummies for the subsidiary ﬁrm based on ISIC Rev. 3
Industry dummies (2d) two-digit industry dummies for the subsidiary ﬁrm based on ISIC Rev. 3
2. Size of the Multinational Corporation
Size of parent ﬁrm number of employees of parent ﬁrm
Size of subsidiary ﬁrm number of employees of subsidiary ﬁrm
Number of aﬃliates number of aﬃliates in Eastern Europe of parent ﬁrm; more than nine subsidiaries
are coded as nine subsidiaries
3. Market Environment
Competition
Many domestic competitors
↪→ subsidiary/parent
dummy that takes a value of one if the subsidiary/parent ﬁrm has many com-
petitors at the domestic market and zero otherwise
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Description
Lerner
↪→ subsidiary/parent market
for a three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industry j of country k:
Lernerjk =
1− 1
Njk
∑
i∈jk
proﬁt before taxesi
operating revenuei
 ∗ 100%,
where Njk denotes the number of ﬁrms i in industry j of country k; a simple
average over the years 1996 to 2000 is taken in addition; parent market and
subsidiary market Lerner denotes the Lerner index calculated for host countries
and for Austria/Germany, respectively
Data source: AMADEUS database (Bureau van Dijk, 2005)
Trade
Many world competitors
↪→ subsidiary/parent
dummy that takes a value of one if the subsidiary/parent ﬁrm has many com-
petitors worldwide and zero otherwise
Import share total imports divided by domestic production at the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level
in host countries and averaged over the years 1996 to 2000; when the three-digit
level information is missing, the two-digit ISIC level is used
Export share total exports divided by domestic production at the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level
in host countries and averaged over the years 1996 to 2000; when the three-digit
level information is missing, the two-digit ISIC level is used
Source of trade data: WITS - UN COMTRADE database (World Bank, 2009)
Source of production data: INDSTAT 4 (three-digit), STAN (two-digit) database
(UNIDO, 2008; OECD, 2009)
Tariﬀs average eﬀective tariﬀs on imports in host countries over the years 1996 to 2000
at the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level; when the three-digit level information is
missing, the two-digit ISIC level is used
Data source: WITS - TRAINS database (World Bank, 2009)
Social Capital in Host Countries
Contract enforcement mean of ranking between one (important) and ﬁve (not important) factors af-
fecting contract enforcement; these factors include the risk of proﬁt transfer,
exchange rate volatility, expropriation, changes in taxes resp. tariﬀs, property
rights, macro-economic instability, political turnaround, corruption, crime and
maﬁa, and banking sector collapse
Trust proportion of people that answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question:
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can't be too careful in dealing with people?"
Data source: World Values Survey, wave 19951999 (WVS Organization, 2009)
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Description
Hierarchical religion proportion of people that list a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholic, Greek
Catholic, Orthodox, Islam, Gregorian or Armenian Apostolic Church) to the
question: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes: Which one?"
Data source: World Values Survey, wave 19951999 (WVS Organization, 2009)
Notes: If not reported otherwise, the data come from a survey of 660 German and Austrian ﬁrms with 2200 investment projects in
Eastern Europe, conducted by the Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich.
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Table 3.13: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs. with
dummy = 1
1. Organization of the Multinational Corporation
Organization of the Parent Firm
Decentralization of parent ﬁrm 1472 2.81 1 5 0.84 .
Parent is located in Germany 2123 0.56 0 1 0.50 1186
Parent is a family ﬁrm 2123 0.16 0 1 0.36 333
Parent is a subsidiary of foreign MNE 2123 0.18 0 1 0.38 372
Parent is a subsidiary of domestic MNE 2123 0.31 0 1 0.46 657
Parent is a domestic MNE 2123 0.36 0 1 0.35 761
Parent is a subsidiary 2123 0.48 0 1 0.50 1029
Organization of the Subsidiary Firm
Decentralization of subsidiary ﬁrm 1388 2.95 1 5 0.69 .
Transplantation via organization 1335 0.24 0 1 0.43 318
Transplantation via CEO 751 0.41 0 1 0.49 306
Intra-ﬁrm trade 1934 0.021 0 1 0.090 .
Parent's ownership share 2093 0.86 0 1 0.23 .
Distance 2122 903.04 17 6000 799.24 .
Horizontal investment 1981 0.82 0 1 0.36 .
Technology is outdated 1826 0.32 0 1 0.47 585
Technology is established 1826 0.60 0 1 0.49 1099
Technology is innovative 1826 0.08 0 1 0.27 142
2. Size of the Multinational Corporation
Size of parent ﬁrm 1993 6970.20 1 233000 25233.78 .
Size of subsidiary ﬁrm 1921 346.61 1 49000 1660.02 .
Number of aﬃliates 2123 5.41 1 9 3.01 .
3. Market Environment
Competition
Many domestic competitors-subsidiary 1978 0.46 0 1 0.50 900
Many domestic competitors-parent 2058 0.46 0 1 0.50 940
↪→ Austria 936 0.45 0 1 0.50 424
↪→ Germany 1122 0.46 0 1 0.50 516
Subsidiary market Lerner 1900 96.57 54.73 124.56 4.42 .
Parent market Lerner 2053 93.68 73.15 121.58 6.14 .
↪→ Austria 890 92.83 77.52 121.58 6.58 .
↪→ Germany 1163 94.32 73.15 119.61 5.69 .
Trade
Many world competitors-subsidiary 1938 0.29 0 1 0.45 563
Many world competitors-parent 2010 0.73 0 1 0.45 1463
↪→ Austria 934 0.72 0 1 0.45 675
↪→ Germany 1076 0.73 0 1 0.44 788
Import share 827 0. 67 0.0028 23.74 1.18 .
Export share 843 0.53 0.0039 25.17 1.07 .
Tariﬀs 875 10.17 0 246.08 19.37 .
Social Capital in Host Countries
Contract enforcement 2064 3.73 1 5 0.71 .
Trust 2101 0.23 0.082 0.52 0.045 .
Hierarchical religion 2100 0.68 0.17 0.98 0.21 .
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3.A.2 Corporate Decisions
Table 3.14: Corporate Decisions in Subsidiary and Parent Firms
Corporate decision1 Mean level of decentralization2
Subsidiary ﬁrms Parent ﬁrms
on acquisitions 1.41 1.34
on a new strategy 1.88 1.90
on transfer prices 2.43 2.45
ﬁnancial decisions 2.54 1.90
on R&D expenditure 2.58 2.79
on budget 2.72 2.70
to introduce a new product 2.80 2.76
to hire 20 new workers 2.82 2.51
to change of a supplier 3.23 3.09
on product price 3.75 3.48
on wage increase 4.10 3.45
to hire two new workers 4.26 3.67
to hire a new secretary 4.65 4.15
1 The corporate decisions listed were collected for both German and Austrian parent ﬁrms as well as all subsidiary ﬁrms and are sorted
from the most centralized to the most decentralized based on subsidiaries.
2 Mean over the rank of one to ﬁve with one (centralized) in which solely the headquarters of the parent ﬁrm take the decision and ﬁve
(decentralized) in which the decision is delegated to the divisional manager (parent ﬁrm) or to the subsidiary manager (subsidiary ﬁrm).
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3.A.3 Market Environment in Host Countries
Figure 3.5: Level of Contract Enforcement in Host Countries
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Notes: The level of contract enforcement is as a mean of ranking between one (important) and ﬁve (not important) factors aﬀecting
contract enforcement; these factors include the risk of proﬁt transfer, exchange rate volatility, expropriation, changes in taxes resp. tariﬀs,
property rights, macro-economic instability, political turnaround, corruption, crime and maﬁa, and banking sector collapse. "Other former
Soviet Union" refers to Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The aggregation
achieves at least eight observations per bar.
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Figure 3.6: Level of Trust in Host Countries
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Notes: The level of trust is the proportion of people that answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"
Figure 3.7: Level of Hierarchical Religion in Host Countries
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Notes: The level of hierarchical religion is the proportion of people that list a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic,
Orthodox, Islam, Gregorian or Armenian Apostolic Church) to the question: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes: Which
one?"
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